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BEHAVIORAL DECISION THEORY AND 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SUPREME COURT’S 
CAMPAIGN FINANCE JURISPRUDENCE 
Molly J. Walker Wilson
ABSTRACT
America stands at a moment in history when advances in the 
understanding of human decision-making are increasing the strategic 
efficacy of political strategy.  As campaign spending for the presidential 
race reaches hundreds of millions of dollars, the potential for 
harnessing the power of psychological tactics becomes considerable. 
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court has characterized campaign money as 
“speech” and has required evidence of corruption or the appearance of 
corruption in order to uphold restrictions on campaign expenditures.  
Ultimately, the Court has rejected virtually all restrictions on campaign 
spending on the ground that expenditures, unlike contributions, do not 
contribute to corruption or the appearance of corruption.  However, 
behavioral decision research and theory provide strong support for the 
notion that expenditures do corrupt the political process, because there 
is a nexus between campaign spending, strategic manipulation, and 
sub-optimal voting decisions.  This Article applies behavioral research 
and theory to advance a new definition of “corruption,” arguing that 
there is a vital governmental interest in regulating campaign 
expenditures in order to limit manipulative campaign tactics and to 
reduce the existing inequities in access to channels of communication 
and persuasion. 
  Assistant Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law. J.D., University of 
Virginia; Ph.D., University of Virginia.  I am grateful to the following people for providing 
feedback at various stages in this project: John Monahan, Jeffrey Rachlinski, Greg Mitchell, 
David Sloss, Jeanne Murray Walker, Eric Miller, and E. Daniel Larkin.  I also benefited from the 
comments of participants at the Saint Louis School of Law Summer Workshop Series. 
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INTRODUCTION
Decision theorists have been writing for several decades about the 
potential for individuals to make sub-optimal choices as a result of 
particular features of human decision-making.  Specifically, people do 
not behave like the “rational actor” depicted in law-and-economic 
theory because of the influence of biases and heuristics (cognitive 
shortcuts) on mental processes.  Jon Hanson and Douglas Kysar have 
argued that certain actors are motivated by economic incentives to 
cultivate strategies designed to exploit these biases for gain.1
Moreover, Hanson and Kysar claim that this form of strategic behavior 
is inevitable in the marketplace, because any entity that declined to 
exploit consumer biases would fail to be competitive and would suffer a 
devastating market share loss.2  In the political marketplace, candidates 
and political parties, no less than corporate actors, have overwhelming 
incentives to manipulate voter decision-making by using knowledge 
about cognitive biases.  But taking advantage of the full arsenal of 
tactics requires a great deal of money.  Political consultants, polling, 
and targeting efforts are all expensive, and there is some evidence that 
holding other factors constant, the candidate who spends the most on 
strategic communication with the electorate is ultimately most likely to 
be successful at the polls. 
The Supreme Court has consistently struck down legislative 
attempts to limit campaign spending on First Amendment grounds.  The 
Court’s jurisprudence assumes that regulating expenditures is 
tantamount to regulating speech, and that there is no sufficiently 
compelling governmental interest justifying the interference with the 
right of free speech.  This supposition discounts the role of money in 
developing strategies for packaging communication in ways that 
ultimately do not serve to inform the electorate, but rather to capitalize 
upon certain “irrationalities” of human decision-making.  Interestingly, 
the Court has allowed limitations on contributions in the interest of 
preventing actual and apparent quid pro quo corruption.  This Article 
argues for a new conceptualization of “corruption,” applying social 
science research and theory to reveal the potential for campaign 
communication to manipulate—rather than inform—the electorate. 
1 Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of 
Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630 (1999). 
2 Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 
1471, 1536 (1998); see also Hanson, supra note 1, at 635, 637 (explaining that those who have 
the motivation and the resources are able to “influence the context in which the decisions are 
made” and ultimately can “shape people’s behavior in desired directions”). 
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Empirical psychological research demonstrates that voters rely 
upon heuristics, or cognitive shortcuts, in determining vote choice.3
Mental shortcuts are prevalent during the voting decision process 
because of the difficulty in obtaining perfect information and the low 
expected yield for any one vote cast.4  These features of the voting 
context make voters particularly vulnerable to manipulation by political 
candidates and parties.5  Meanwhile, political candidates have 
tremendous incentives to engage in vote-maximizing tactics.6  The 
competition of the political marketplace, along with the potential 
expected gain from utilizing exploitative campaign tactics create the 
perfect storm, virtually assuring financial commitment to innovative 
techniques that capitalize on human irrationalities.7
In theory, a wide array of biases and heuristics could prove fertile 
ground for propaganda efforts.  However, several are particularly 
3 Social science research indicates that voters do not behave “rationally” when making 
voting decisions.  See, e.g., Elizabeth Garrett & Daniel A. Smith, Veiled Political Actors and 
Campaign Disclosure Laws in Direct Democracy, 4 ELECTION L.J. 295, 296 (2005); see also
Anita S. Krishnakumar, Towards a Madisonian, Interest-Group-Based, Approach to Lobbying 
Regulation, 58 ALA. L. REV. 513 (2007).  For the proposition that voters rely upon cues or 
heuristics and do not gain all relevant information, see ARTHUR LUPIA & MATHEW D.
MCCUBBINS, THE DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA: CAN CITIZENS LEARN WHAT THEY NEED TO KNOW? 
(1998); Christopher S. Elmendorf, Representation Reinforcement Through Advisory 
Commissions: The Case of Election Law, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1366, 1424-25 (2005); Elizabeth 
Garrett, The William J. Brennan Lecture in Constitutional Law: The Future of Campaign Finance 
Reform Laws in the Courts and in Congress, 27 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 665, 678 (2002); Michael 
S. Kang, Democratizing Direct Democracy: Restoring Voter Competence Through Heuristic 
Cues and “Disclosure Plus,” 50 UCLA L. REV. 1141 (2003); James H. Kuklinski & Paul J. 
Quirk, Reconsidering the Rational Public: Cognition, Heuristics, and Mass Opinion, in 
ELEMENTS OF REASON: COGNITION, CHOICE, AND THE BOUNDS OF RATIONALITY 153 (Arthur 
Lupia et al. eds., 2000); David Schleicher, Irrational Voters, Rational Voting, 7 ELECTION L.J. 
149, 154 (2008).
4 See Krishnakumar, supra note 3, at 537.
5 See William T. Bianco, Different Paths to the Same Result: Rational Choice, Political 
Psychology, and Impression Formation in Campaigns, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1061 (1998); see also
Larry M. Bartels, Uninformed Votes: Information Effects in Presidential Elections, 40 AM. J.
POLI. SCI. 194 (1996); Thomas E. Nelson & Zoe M. Oxley, Issue Framing Effects on Belief 
Importance and Opinion, 61 J. POL. 1040, 1045 (1999); Thomas E. Nelson et al., Toward a 
Psychology of Framing Effects, 19 POL. BEHAV. 221, 226 (1997); Brian F. Schaffner, Priming 
Gender: Campaigning on Women’s Issues in U.S. Senate Elections, 49 AM. J. POLI. SCI. 803, 803 
(2005) (explaining that because they tend to be closer to the views of women on these issues, 
Democratic candidates who decide to target women are more likely to use their campaigns to 
prime women’s issues while Republicans will attempt to draw attention away from those topics 
toward other issues). 
6 Shanto Iyengar & Adam F. Simon, New Perspectives and Evidence on Political 
Communications and Campaign Effects, 51 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 149, 150 (2000). 
7 Many have been critical of political actors who engage in tactics blatantly designed to 
capitalize on the irrationalities of the public, but the real fault lies not with the individual or party 
actors, but with the structures that make manipulation so prevalent.  See Reza DiBadj, 
Reconceiving the Firm, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1459, 1461 (2005) (“[T]he problem may not be 
with government per se, but with the structures that allow private parties to manipulate it.” 
(referencing AMITAI ETZIONI, THE MORAL DIMENSION: TOWARD A NEW ECONOMICS 217 
(1988)). 
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relevant in the political campaign context.  One bias that has been 
widely exploited by politicians is framing.  Research on framing reveals 
that the manner in which a choice is presented can influence the 
decision-maker’s preference.8  The potential for exploitation through 
the use of frames is significant because framing can be a simple matter 
of strategic word choice and can lead individuals to make a choice that 
differs substantially from their initial preference.9  Commentators have 
noted that the strategic use of frames can have important effects on the 
attitudes and behaviors of a target.10
Priming is another bias-based strategy which, like framing, can be 
used to influence attitudes and decisions.11  Also known as “agenda-
setting,” political-campaign priming leads voters to consider particular 
issues to be particularly important by presenting these issues repeatedly 
in a variety of formats.12  The availability heuristic is related to priming 
in that both can influence the relative ordering of voters’ priorities.  By 
portraying certain issues, events, or risks repeatedly and in vivid terms, 
candidates can assure that these issues, events, or risks will become 
cognitively “available” to voters and will be weighted heavily during 
the vote-decision process.13  Finally, attitudes or impressions created 
8 See generally Eldar Sharfir, Prospect Theory and Political Analysis: A Psychological 
Perspective, 13 POL. PSYCHOL. 311, 313-14 (1992) (providing a definition of framing).  For early 
discussions of framing, see ERVING GOFFMAN, FRAME ANALYSIS: AN ESSAY ON THE 
ORGANIZATION OF EXPERIENCE (1974); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of 
Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453 (1981). 
9 See Richard H. Thaler, Mental Accounting Matters, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES
241, 244 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000); Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 8, 
at 457-58. 
10 James N. Druckman, On the Limits of Framing Effects: Who Can Frame?, 63 J. POL. 1041, 
1059 (2001) (finding that “the results from both experiments suggest that a credible source can 
use a frame to alter the perceived importance of different considerations, and this, in turn, can 
change overall opinion,” but qualifying this assertion with the caveat that the source must be 
credible); Donald R. Kinder & Don Herzog, Democratic Discussion, in RECONSIDERING THE 
DEMOCRATIC PUBLIC 347 (George E. Marcus & Russell L. Hanson eds., 1993). 
11 See LUPIA & MCCUBBINS, supra note 3, at 3 (distinguishing priming from framing). 
12 See Schaffner, supra note 5, at 805-07 (discussing the ways in which candidates increase 
the salience or weight assigned to various issues); see also DAVID C. BARKER, RUSHED TO 
JUDGMENT: TALK RADIO, PERSUASION, AND AMERICAN POLITICAL BEHAVIOR 10-11 (2002); 
SHANTO IYENGAR & DONALD KINDER, NEWS THAT MATTERS (1987); DARRELL WEST, AIR 
WARS: TELEVISION  ADVERTISING IN ELECTION CAMPAIGNS, 1952-2000 (3d ed. 2001); James N. 
Druckman et al., Candidate Strategies to Prime Issues and Image, 66 J. POL. 1180, 1181 (2004); 
James N. Druckman & Justin W. Holmes, Does Presidential Rhetoric Matter? Priming and 
Presidential Approval, 34 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 755-78 (2004); James N. Druckman, Priming 
the Vote: Campaign Effects in a U.S. Senate Election, 25 POL. PSYCHOL. 577, 590 (2004); Frank 
Pasquale, Reclaiming Egalitarianism in the Political Theory of Campaign Finance Reform, 2008 
U. ILL. L. REV. 599. 
13 See Molly J. Walker Wilson & Megan P. Fuchs, Publicity, Pressure, and Environmental 
Legislation: The Untold Story of Availability Campaigns, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2147, 2149 
(2009) (“The availability heuristic is a widely-used mental shortcut that leads people to assign a 
higher likelihood to events that are readily ‘available’—events that are particularly likely to come 
to mind due to their vividness, recency, or frequency.”). 
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through the use of priming and framing may be strengthened by the 
confirmation bias.14
The notion that candidates and their surrogates exploit these and 
other biases in efforts to influence voting behavior is more than 
theoretical.  History is replete with examples of candidates capitalizing 
on opportunities to harness the effects of cognitive irrationalities, and 
there is ample evidence of campaign dollars being used in furtherance 
of this goal.  Although some scholars have argued that campaigning 
ultimately has “minimal effects” on election outcomes, this claim has 
been discredited by empirical studies of voting behavior.15  Moreover, 
some evidence indicates that the relationship between campaign dollars 
spent and success in the polls is linear, or nearly so.16  The use of 
campaign money to develop cognition-based strategies is of particular 
concern in light of empirical evidence that when citizens rely upon 
heuristics, they become less accurate in their voting decisions.17
Throughout its campaign finance jurisprudence, the Court has 
maintained that restrictions on campaign funding implicate freedom of 
speech concerns, and therefore require an overriding governmental 
interest.  The Court has held that “corruption or the appearance of 
corruption” is a sufficiently compelling interest to merit impinging on 
freedom of speech.18  However, as John Shockley has noted, the Court 
has resolutely rejected the claim of “many legal scholars and political 
analysts [who] forcefully argue that the Court’s definition of corruption 
should include the systemic view that financial power fosters unchecked 
or unaccountable influence in any electoral setting,”19 and it has struck 
down virtually every spending limit proposed.20  In so doing, the Court 
14 Voters who experience the confirmation bias selectively ignore information that is 
inconsistent with a previously held favorable opinion of a candidate.  See Michael Shermer, The 
Political Brain, 295 SCI. AM. 36 (2006), available at http://www.scientificamerican.com/ 
article.cfm?id=the-political-brain; see also Peter R. Schorott, Electoral Consequences of 
“Winning” Televised Campaign Debates, 54 PUB. OPINION Q. 567, 568 (1990) (the process 
called “group polarization” occurs when like-minded people reinforce and strengthen one 
another’s views); Alexander Stille, Adding Up the Costs of Cyberdemocracy, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 
2001, at B9 (discussing practical consequences of polarization). 
15 See Stanton A. Glantz et al., Election Outcomes: Whose Money Matters?, 38 J. POL. 1033, 
1038 (1976) (presenting empirical findings supporting the notion that capping expenditures 
would make “race[s] more competitive by preventing incumbents from swamping their 
challengers financially”). 
16 Id.
17 An “accurate” vote is widely understood to be one that the voter would cast if he or she had 
all of the relevant information.  See Bartels, supra note 5, at 217; Kuklinski & Quirk, supra note 
3; Jeffrey J. Mondak, Cognitive Heuristics, Heuristic Processing, and Efficiency in Political 
Decision Making, in 4 RESEARCH IN MICROPOLITICS 84-104 (M. Delli Carpini et al. eds., 1994).  
18 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1976); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 161 (2003). 
19 John S. Shockley, Direct Democracy, Campaign Finance, and the Courts: Can 
Corruption, Undue Influence, and Declining Voter Confidence Be Found?, 39 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
377, 383-84 (1985).  For the Court’s rationale, see Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48. 
20 The singular exception is Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990).  
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has equated money with speech, a notion that conflates spending to 
bring a message to the electorate with spending for other purposes—
most notably to develop strategies that are designed to strategically 
manipulate voters’ preferences.  Research from social and cognitive 
psychology reveals ways in which certain campaign strategies can 
induce sub-optimal vote decisions.21  Ironically, while more money can 
increase the amount of campaign communication, it can also lower the 
quality of the communication. 
While the primary concern over unlimited spending is the potential 
for money to increase manipulative communication and corrupt voting 
decisions, there is a secondary effect relating more directly to inequality 
in access to funding.  To the extent that social science demonstrates the 
potential for various strategic efforts to yield results, concerns arise over 
the potential for well-funded actors to gain a substantial edge in 
manipulating election outcomes.22  As Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote, 
“[r]epresentative government is in essence self-government through the 
medium of elected representatives of the people, and each and every 
citizen has an inalienable right to full and effective participation in the 
political processes of his State’s legislative bodies.”23  Participatory 
democracy embodies notions of political equality, so that the legitimacy 
of a government rests upon the inclusion and informed consent of its 
members of society.24  Ultimately, “[t]he broader purposes of our 
political system are ill-served . . . by allowing too many contests to turn 
on the differences in the amounts of money that candidates have to 
spend.”25
This Article proceeds in four Parts.  Part I makes the case that 
campaign money buys more than communication—it also buys the 
ability to implement psychological strategies designed to capitalize on 
known features of human cognition.  This Part delves into behavioral 
research and theory, detailing several cognitive theories that describe 
how carefully crafted campaign communication can lead individual 
voters to make sub-optimal choices.  It also provides some historical 
See infra Part III.B. 
21 For support of this premise, see Francis N. Botchway, Good Governance: The Old, the 
New, the Principle, and the Elements, 13 FLA. J. INT’L L. 159 (2001); Keith D. Ewing, Promoting 
Political Equality: Spending Limits in British Electoral Law, 2 ELECTION L.J. 499 (2003); Lori 
Ringhand, Defining Democracy: The Supreme Court’s Campaign Finance Dilemma, 56 
HASTINGS L.J. 77 (2004).
22 See Daniel R. Oritz, The Democratic Paradox of Campaign Finance Reform, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 893, 896 (1998) (“[D]emocracy requires not only an equal opportunity for people’s votes to 
make a difference, but also an equal opportunity for people to persuade others to their views.”). 
23 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964) (the seminal Supreme Court case on state 
legislative apportionment). 
24 See John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, at ii, viii, 4, 95, reprinted in READINGS ON 
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 530, 551 (F.W. Coker ed., 1938). 
25 J. Skelly Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the First Amendment an Obstacle 
to Political Equality?, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 609, 631 (1982). 
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examples of candidates employing psychological tactics.  Part II draws 
a link between campaign dollars and voting outcomes, exploring 
theories from political science and behavioral decision theory that 
support this connection.  Part III provides background on campaign 
finance reform, focusing on the Supreme Court’s rejection of spending 
limits in Buckley v. Valeo and its progeny.  Finally, Part IV argues for a 
governmental interest in limiting campaign spending.  This Part argues 
for a broader definition of “corruption” than the Court’s quid pro quo 
definition, and describes the potential threat to democracy posed by 
inequality created when one segment of the population possesses the 
resources and right to overwhelm the debate. 
I. WHAT CAMPAIGN DOLLARS BUY: THE CASE FOR SPENDING LIMITS 
FROM SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH AND THEORY
Models of information transmission imply that the ideological 
faction that expends sufficient resources on propaganda and 
manipulation, and that sends sufficiently loud signals can always 
prevail in defining the terms of debate . . . .26
One theme running throughout the Supreme Court’s somewhat 
disjointed campaign jurisprudence is a First Amendment-based 
commitment to protecting the ability of individuals and groups to 
communicate political ideas and promote candidates of their choosing.27
A critical assumption of this free speech focus is the notion that the 
primary function of campaign funds is to buy communication.28  In 
Buckley v. Valeo, the Court made this assumption explicit when it stated 
that “it is of particular importance that candidates have the unfettered
opportunity to make their views known so that the electorate may 
intelligently evaluate the candidates’ personal qualities and their 
positions on vital public issues before choosing among them on election 
day.”29  Even proponents of spending limits who express concerns over 
equality and decry the ability of well-funded interests to “drown out” 
the opposition often assume a simple correlation between money and 
message volume.30  Much of the discussion downplays or ignores 
26 Dennis Chong, Creating Common Frames of Reference on Political Issues, in POLITICAL 
PERSUASION AND ATTITUDE CHANGE 222, 231 (Diana C. Mutz et al. eds., 1996). 
27 See infra Part III for a detailed discussion. 
28 See id.
29 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 52-53 (1976) (citations omitted). Buckley, its 
predecessors, and its progeny are discussed in substantially more detail in Part III, infra. 
30 See, e.g., Burt Neuborne, Buckley’s Analytical Flaws, 6 J.L. & POL’Y 111, 120-21 (1997) 
(“When we are planning the process that will culminate in the selection of a great deliberative 
assembly of the people, why is it not possible to impose structural rules on ourselves to assure 
that one person does not drown everyone else out and that everyone gets a fair chance to have his 
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entirely the fact that campaign funds buy more than communication.  In 
the political arena no less than in other “markets,” consultants, targeted 
research efforts, and high-priced strategists consume a substantial 
portion of the available funds.31  Campaign messages are crafted with 
the utmost care, often after lengthy consultation with experts and “spin 
doctors.”32  Information is often truncated, intentionally reduced to 
“sound bites” or otherwise packaged to have maximum impact in a 
manner that is best for the candidate’s prospect in the election, 
simultaneously rendering it about as informative and educational to the 
recipient as the average cat food commercial. 
The indispensable role that political consultants have come to 
occupy in modern politics is indicative of the importance of tactical 
maneuvering in political campaigns.33  The price tag for political 
strategy experts is considerable.34  Yet candidates consistently 
demonstrate a willingness to commit campaign funds to retain these 
professionals.35  Political consultants supply a critical knowledge of 
those cognitive mechanisms that have been successfully exploited by 
marketing strategists in other forums.  It has been remarked: 
Politics and campaigns are structured around how, where, and to 
whom a candidate or issue should be presented. In developing such 
strategies and tactics, campaign managers and political consultants 
do not turn to texts on American government or treatises on 
democratic theories. Instead, they consult experts in product 
development and advertising.36
The methods and purpose of political consultants are particularly 
important, given their central role in politics and the power they wield.  
Some commentators have gone so far as to argue that political 
or her say?  The Buckley rules forbid us to try.”). 
31 See LAWRENCE R. JACOBS & ROBERT Y. SHAPIRO, POLITICIANS DON’T PANDER (2000) 
(describing the considerable resources invested by political operatives in efforts to craft messages 
that will persuade the public). 
32 Id.
33 JAMES A. THURBER & CANDICE J. NELSON, CAMPAIGN WARRIORS: THE ROLE OF 
POLITICAL CONSULTANTS IN ELECTIONS 2 (2000) (asserting that consultants are so central to the 
campaign process that they exercise key influence over it). 
34 See Edward L. Barrett, Jr., Political Money and Freedom of Speech, 30 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 663, 684 (1997) (“Where does all this political money go?  The biggest expense is the cost 
of purchasing advertising time on television (though increasingly, political consultants take a 
hefty share).”); see also Linda L. Fowler, The Best Congress Money Can Buy?, 6 ELECTION L.J. 
417, 420 (2007) (reviewing JENNIFER A. STEEN, SELF-FINANCED CANDIDATES IN 
CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS (2006)) (discussing the “escalating costs of campaigns” and 
“dominance of political consultants in shaping election messages”). 
35 See LARRY SABATO, THE RISE OF POLITICAL CONSULTANTS: NEW WAYS OF WINNING 
ELECTIONS 49-53 (1981). 
36 Mary J. Culnan & Patricia M. Regan, Privacy Issues and the Creation of Campaign 
Mailing Lists, 11 INFO. SOC’Y 85, 86-87 (1995). 
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decision.42  Evidence from empirical studies of how human beings 
consultants have had important (and perhaps deleterious) influence 
within the campaign finance debate. 37
Of course, political communication must be designed to be 
persuasive, but the content and quality of the messages vary in the 
degree to which they capitalize on human irrationalities and biases.38  A 
crucial question for public advocates, commentators, and the Court is 
whether unfettered access to campaign funds intensifies the strategic 
distortion of information.  Ultimately, this is an empirical question, and 
a tricky one to answer.  Political candidates are unlikely to supply the 
type of information that would make detailed analysis feasible.39  Even 
if it were possible to gain access to records of funds spent on strategy 
sessions and specific techniques employed, the challenge of directly 
linking dollars spent to specific impacts on voting behavior might well 
be insurmountable.  In the absence of direct data, psychological 
research and theory provide insight regarding the potential for 
manipulative communication to distort vote choice.40  Specifically, 
social and cognitive psychological research reveals the power of 
targeted communication strategies to directly and indirectly influence 
decision-making.41 This varied and robust literature can shed light on 
how “strategy dollars” impact voting behavior. 
A.     The Not-So-Rational Voter: Heuristics and Biases  
in Campaign Tactics 
Most of the current scholarship on voting behavior was born out of 
previous attempts to describe human judgment-formation more 
generally.  Arguably, the most influential of the early theories was 
rational choice theory—the notion that in forming judgments, people 
are rational actors who consider all relevant information, apply reason, 
and weigh costs and benefits to arrive at a utility-maximizing 
37 See Robert F. Bauer, A Report from the Field: Campaign Professionals on the First 
Election Cycle Under the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, 5 ELECTION L.J. 105 (2006) 
(considering consultants for their role in, or impact on, elections); see also James A. Thurber et 
. n Consultants, in CAMPAIGN WARRIORS: THE ROLE OF POLITICAL 
O
 Caputo, Florida Lawmakers Want Names Behind Political Attack Ads, 
9, 2009, available at http://www.miamiherald.com/news/southflorida/ 
Part II. 
al , Portrait of Campaig
C NSULTANTS 33-34 (2000). 
38 See infra Part I.A. 
39 See, e.g., Marc
MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 
story/1213491.html. 
40 See infra 
41 See Schaffner, supra note 5, at 805; see also IYENGAR & KINDER, supra note 12; WEST, 
supra note 12. 
42 An early attempt to apply a theoretical framework of human behavior to legal problems 
was born out of two ground-breaking articles: Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L.
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formulate choice suggests that individuals are not “rational” in the strict 
sense of the word.  Rather, individuals have limited memories, an 
inability to gather all relevant information and correctly weight factors, 
and the tendency to be influenced by biased or irrelevant information.43
Behavioral decision theorists have focused much of their work on 
identifying systematic ways in which human decision-making deviates 
from rational choice theory.44  The image of people as rational 
maximizers has not held up under close empirical scrutiny.45  Instead of 
the elegant, parsimonious theory offered by classical law and 
economics, social science research has given rise to an untidy 
constellation of heuristics and biases that serve as the basis for much of 
human decision-making.46
& ECON. 1 (1960), and Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of 
Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961).  The publication of these articles is widely viewed as marking 
the birth of law and economics, or the application of economic principles to legal problems.  See, 
e.g., Amnon Lehavi, The Property Puzzle, 96 GEO. L.J. 1987, 1990 (2008) (discussing the 
ics, simply stated, 
ies show that in making individualized judgments people rely primarily on 
gs process 
timism 
“foundational writings of Ronald Coase and . . . Guido Calabresi”); see also ROBERT COOTER &
THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 2 (4th ed. 2004). 
43 Herbert Simon introduced the notion of “bounded rationality” in the 1950s to account for 
the fact that human beings have finite computational resources available for making choices.  See 
HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY: BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND 
BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 2 (1982).  Decision-making using incomplete or imperfect information 
is an important feature of human functioning in the real world.  Scholarship supporting this notion 
is abundant.  Sometimes called behavioral decision theory, sometimes behavioral law and 
economics, the interdisciplinary field that explores cognitive features of human decision-making 
combines law, psychology, and economic principles—as they relate to the “rational actor.”  See, 
e.g., Jolls et al., supra note 2, at 1476 (“The task of behavioral law and econom
is to explore the implications of actual not hypothesized human behavior for the law.  How do 
‘real people’ differ from homo economicus?” (internal parentheses omitted)). 
44 See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 341, 347-48 (1984); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An 
Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 263-91 (1979) [hereinafter Kahneman 
& Tversky, Prospect Theory]; Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Subjective Probability: A 
Judgment of Representativeness, 3 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 430, 430 (1972).  For some early law 
review pieces discussing heuristical processing and responses in legal frameworks, see Alan 
Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples 
of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1436-42 (1983) (discussing the 
availability and representative heuristics); Barbara D. Underwood, Law and the Crystal Ball: 
Predicting Behavior with Statistical Inference and Individualized Judgment, 88 YALE L.J. 1408,
1428 (1979) (“[S]tud
information about the case at hand, paying relatively little attention to background information 
about other cases.”). 
45 See BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000); CHOICES, VALUES,
AND FRAMES, supra note 9 (discussing empirical investigations of how human bein
information and make choices).  For an early discussion of behavioral decision-making, see
Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. ECON. 99 (1955). 
46 These heuristics and biases have been discussed under the rubric of “behavioral decision 
theory” or “behavioral law and economics,” and include anchoring and adjustment, op
bias, representativeness heuristic, hindsight bias, conjunction fallacy, endowment effect and 
related status quo bias, risk aversion, and, of course, availability heuristic, to name a few. 
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latively cursory way means that the 
decision-making process is particularly vulnerable to manipulation by 
political candidates and parties.53
Voters—who, after all, are simply human beings performing one of 
many decision tasks—routinely violate norms of rationality.47  Each 
time a voter casts a ballot, he or she does so knowing that the individual 
vote will have little impact.48  Accordingly, the very act of voting is 
irrational from a strict utility perspective.  Furthermore, because a single 
voter has little power to influence an election outcome, the time that 
most voters devote to investigating the records and policy positions of 
political candidates is limited.49 Armed with relatively scant 
information, voters tend to rely heavily upon heuristics.50  Heuristics are 
cognitive shortcuts that serve to “keep the information processing 
demands of the task within bounds”—a useful function, particularly in 
low-information situations.51  Voters’ use of heuristics is ultimately 
sensible—after all, like other types of decision-making, voting involves 
gathering, assimilating, and weighting a great deal of information 
derived from a potentially large number of sources.52  However, the 
tendency of voters to rely on less than perfect information and to 
process that information in a re
47 See Kuklinski & Quirk, supra note 3, at 181-82 (“We have cautioned against overly 
optimistic accounts of a politically competent, rational public.  Citizens not only are minimally 
informed, as nearly all scholars agree; but they are also prone to bias and error in using the 
limited information they receive.”). 
48 See Daniel J. Schwartz, The Potential Effects of Nondeferential Review on Interest Group 
Incentives and Voter Turnout, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1845, 1851 (2002) (“Public choice theory 
teps to improve 
ring the information environment to provide citizens 
i
r, 
affner, supra note 5. 
t political strategies that systematically 
assumes that each voter is economically rational, meaning that he will vote only if his expected 
benefits, discounted by the possibility that his vote will not affect the outcome, exceed his costs.” 
(citations omitted)); see also Roger L. Faith & Robert D. Tollison, Expressive Versus Economic 
Voting, in PREDICTING POLITICS 231, 231 (W. Mark Crain & Robert D. Tollison eds., 1990). 
49 Elizabeth Garrett and Daniel Smith argue that policymakers should take s
the cues upon which voters typically rely in order to improve the “competence” of the electorate.  
See Garrett & Smith, supra note 3, at 296-97 (“Accordingly, policymakers can improve the 
competence of ordinary voters by structu
w th cues or heuristics that will help them vote competently with limited data.”). 
50 Id. at 296; see also Bartels, supra note 5; Bianco, supra note 5, at 1064; Krishnakuma
supra note 3; Kuklinski & Quirk, supra note 3, at 181; Nelson & Oxley, supra note 5; Nelson et 
al., supra note 5; Sch
51 Robert P. Abelson & Ariel Levi, Decision Making and Decision Theory, in 1 THE 
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 231-309 (Gardner Lindzey & Elliot Aronson eds., 1985). 
52 See also Bianco, supra note 5, at 1064; Krishnakumar, supra note 3, at 537; Kuklinski & 
Quirk, supra note 3. 
53 It is important to note that this is a potential rather than an inevitability.  Voters vary in 
their susceptibility to manipulative tactics.  Moreover, candidates vary in the degree to which they 
engage in the systematic exploitation of cognitive heuristics. Communication that 
straightforwardly presents a candidate’s policy position does not exploit these cognitive 
tendencies.  Where communication crosses the line from informative to exploitative is not always 
clear.  One of this Article’s objectives is to make the case that few, if any, national political 
candidates eschew strategic tactics of this type.  Indeed, it is difficult to know whether, under our 
current system, a national candidate could be successful without the use of the techniques 
described in this Article.  However, this Article argues tha
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Political scientists have suggested that voters are competent, even 
though the vote that they cast is based on limited information, if it is the 
same vote they would have cast if they had had complete information.54
To the degree that a voter’s reliance on limited information and 
cognitive heuristics results in a vote that is different from that which he 
or she would have cast with full information, the voter is not competent, 
and the vote is “incorrect.”55  The question is whether in light of what 
we know about how human beings make choices, voting decisions are 
vulnerable to cognition-based strategies.  While the evidence is not 
incontrovertible, several bodies of research suggest that there is reason 
for concern.  One commentator noted: 
[R]esearch in the basic sciences of human cognition—neural science, 
cognitive psychology, and evolutionary psychology—has converged 
on several findings that are relevant for models of mass politics.  
Contrary to the political-heuristics and collective-opinion 
perspectives, these findings suggest that human cognition is not well 
adapted to the tasks of citizens.56
Voters already struggle to make utility-maximizing decisions in the 
complex political marketplace; the challenge increases when millions of 
dollars are spent to influence those decisions to favor particular 
candidates. 
B.     Some Examples of Heuristics and Biases Exploited During 
Political Campaigning 
The potential for sub-optimal vote decisions has been played down 
by some commentators who have argued that even when voters rely on 
imperfect informational cues or use shortcuts to arrive at a decision, 
they still may vote competently.57  However, a substantial body of 
research from social and cognitive psychology and political science 
lead voters to make decisions that are different from those they would otherwise make should be 
. Lau & David P. Redlawsk, 
uristics in Political Decision Making, 45 AM. J.
O
e 3, at 154. 
minimized, and that gross disparities in the availability of funds with which to engage in these 
tactics should be eliminated, in order to create greater equality amongst political candidates for 
the good of the voting public and the goals of democracy. 
54 See Garrett & Smith, supra note 3, at 296; see also Elisabeth R. Gerber & Arthur Lupia, 
Voter Competence in Direct Legislation Elections, in CITIZEN, COMPETENCE AND DEMOCRATIC 
INSTITUTIONS 147, 149 (Stephen L. Elkin & Karol Edward Soltan eds., 1999). 
55 Gerber & Lupia, supra note 54, at 149; see also Kuklinski & Quirk, supra note 3, at 156-57 
(finding that the voting public is prone to make errors); Richard R
Advantages and Disadvantages of Cognitive He
P L. SCI. 951, 966 (2001) (“In fact, heavy reliance on political heuristics actually made decision 
making less accurate among those low in political sophistication.”). 
56 Kuklinski & Quirk, supra not
57 See Garrett & Smith, supra note 3; see also Bartels, supra note 5; Bianco, supra note 5; 
Krishnakumar, supra note 3; Kuklinski & Quirk, supra note 3, at 157; Nelson & Oxley, supra 
note 5; Nelson et al., supra note 5. 
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lling evidence of political 
strategy based distortions in voting behavior. 
1.     Framing 
cal 
resea
casts serious doubt on this assertion.58  Of those heuristics and biases 
most relevant to the vote-decision context, empirical investigations of 
priming and framing provide the most compe
Often something as simple as the way in which a choice is 
presented or framed can influence the decision-maker’s preference in 
profound ways.59  The effects of framing can be seen when two 
“logically equivalent (but not transparently equivalent) statements of a 
problem lead decision makers to choose different options.”60  Framing 
theory is rooted in prospect theory, a ground-breaking proposal for how 
certain features of a decision context can influence perceptions and 
decision outcomes.61  Prospect theory has two main claims about how 
people make decisions with respect to a course of action when the 
outcome is uncertain.  First, individuals assign more significance to a 
loss of a certain amount than they do to an equivalent gain.62  Second, 
people overweigh low probabilities and underweigh moderate and high 
probabilities.63  As a result, decision-makers are often inaccurate in 
determining how likely an outcome is and, as a result, misjudge risks.  
The premises of prospect theory have been borne out by empiri
rch and have been demonstrated in a wide variety of contexts.64
58 See Kuklinski & Quirk, supra note 3, at 156 (“Judging from . . . this research, various and 
sometimes severe distortions can occur in people’s political judgments.  They hold inaccurate and 
al or other biases, and rely heavily on 
, supra note 8.  For early 
E 11, 36 (1998). 
neman & Tversky, Prospect Theory, supra note 44, at 279. 
id.
51, S260-62 (1986) (noting that consumers prefer to forgo a discount 
stereotyped factual beliefs, hold their beliefs overconfidently, resist correct information, prefer 
easy arguments, interpret elite statements according to raci
scanty information about a candidate’s policy positions.”). 
59 See Sharfir, supra note 8 (“Framing refers to the tendency of normatively inconsequential 
changes in the formulation of a choice problem to affect the ways people represent the problem 
and, consequently, their preferences.”); Tversky & Kahneman
discussions of framing, see GOFFMAN, supra note 8. 
60 Matthew Rabin, Psychology and Economics, 36 J. ECON. LITERATUR
61 See Kah
62 See 
63 Id.
64 See Darryl K. Brown, Regulating Decision Effects of Legally Sufficient Jury Instructions, 
73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1105, 1112-13 (2000) (discussing the importance of wording on jury decision-
making); Shane Frederick, Measuring Intergenerational Time Preference: Are Future Lives 
Valued Less?, 26 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 39, 48 (2003); Eric J. Johnson et al., Framing, 
Probability Distortions, and Insurance Decisions, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES, supra
note 9, at 224, 225 (analyzing framing in the context of consumers’ decisions about insurance); 
Edward J. Mccaffery et al., Framing the Jury: Cognitive Perspectives on Pain and Suffering 
Awards, 81 VA. L. REV. 1341, 1403 (1995) (finding that framing has substantial effects on non-
pecuniary damage awards); Barbara J. McNeil et al., On the Elicitation of Preferences for 
Alternative Therapies, 306 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1259 (1982) (describing how framing influences 
medical decisions); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of 
Decisions, 59 J. BUS. S2
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on.67
Inde
ere is an informational asymmetry (and asymmetries are 
nearly universal in the consumer context), a framing effect is 
possible.”70
The potential for exploitation of human decision-making through 
the use of frames is significant in the political marketplace, because 
framing is often simply a matter of strategic word choice—a simple 
restructuring of syntax can have important effects because “different 
frames can lead to different choices.”65  There is some debate with 
respect to whether the target is passive or active in shifting focus 
according to the frame presented.66  However, there is little controversy 
with respect to the power of framing techniques to influence opini
ed, the potential for strategic employment of this cognitive 
tendency has been cited as a hallmark characteristic of framing.68
Characteristics of the decision-maker or decision-making context 
that could theoretically decrease an individual’s vulnerability to 
manipulation rarely have that effect.  For example, framing effects are 
so powerful that even professionals who arguably have the knowledge 
and expertise to avoid being misled are influenced by the way an 
outcome is framed.69  Moreover, the potential for impact on decisions 
through linguistics or literal representations is almost limitless.  As one 
commentator noted, “[f]raming is a potentially ubiquitous phenomenon: 
anywhere th
than to pay a surcharge). 
65 See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 8, at 454; see also Thaler, supra note 9. 
66 For support for the passive view, see SHANTO IYENGAR, IS ANYONE RESPONSIBLE?: HOW 
TELEVISION FRAMES POLITICAL ISSUES 130-36 (1991); JOHN ZALLER, THE NATURE AND 
ORIGINS OF MASS OPINION 83-84 (1992).  For a discussion of research that supports the notion 
that individuals consciously and deliberately think about the relative importance of different 
considerations suggested by a frame, see Thomas E. Nelson et al., Media Framing of a Civil 
Liberties Conflict and Its Effect on Tolerance, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 567 (1997).  See also
Thomas E. Nelson & Donald R. Kinder, Issue Frames and Group-Centrism in American Public 
Opinion, 58 J. POL. 1055 (1996); Nelson & Oxley, supra note 5; Nelson et al., supra note 5. 
67 See Hanson & Kysar, supra note 1, at 684-85 (“[F]raming effects are somewhat different 
from the other cognitive anomalies that have been identified by behavioral researchers.  They are 
perhaps the most obviously exploitable of the biases, capable, for instance, of causing dramatic 
preference reversals based on an entirely nonsubstantive shift in terminology.  And that is true 
inasmuch as they trigger or reflect the operation of other cognitive biases.”). 
68 Jonathan Remy Nash, Framing Effects and Regulatory Choice, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
313, 317 (2006) (stating that one important aspect of framing is “the ability of someone who is 
propounding an option to present the option—i.e., to frame it—in such a way as to take advantage 
of framing effects and make the option seem more or less desirable”). 
69 For example, physicians—like their patients—prefer a treatment option when told that “90 
live through the postoperative period and 34 are alive at the end of 5 years,” than when they are 
told, “10 die during the postoperative period and 66 die by the end of 5 years,” although the only 
difference between these outcomes is in the way they are stated.  Donald A. Redelmeier et al., 
Understanding Patients’ Decisions: Cognitive and Emotional Perspectives, 270 J. AM. MED.
ASS’N 72, 73 (1993). 
70 Richard L. Hasen, Efficiency Under Informational Asymmetry: The Effect of Framing on 
Legal Rules, 38 UCLA L. REV. 391, 393 (1990). 
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2.     How Candidates Use Framing 
Framing is indeed ubiquitous in the political realm.  The typical 
political candidate devotes considerable resources to framing the debate 
so as to gain an advantage.71  In research on political campaign 
communications, framing has been described as the process by which a 
source characterizes a particular social or political issue and defines the 
considerations allegedly relevant to that issue.72  Candidates frame by 
placing emphasis on a particular subset of potentially relevant 
considerations, causing listeners to focus on these considerations when 
forming an opinion about the issue.73  In the popular media, framing has 
been recognized as a critical tool for politicians and parties alike, in the 
effort to control the agenda and the hearts and minds of Americans.74
Some scholars have expressed concern over the ease with which 
framing can serve the purposes of anyone who has sufficient resources.  
For example, Kinder and Herzog have explained that their “worry about 
the nefarious possibilities of framing is just that they can become 
freewheeling exercises in pure manipulation.”75  One subset of framing 
called “valence framing” occurs when choice is influenced by language 
that describes options in diametrically opposed positive or negative 
terms.76  Indeed, valence framing may be the most common type of 
framing seen during political campaigns.  One example provided by 
71 Dennis Chong, How People Think, Reason, and Feel About Rights and Liberties, 37 J. 
POL. SCI. 867, 870 (1993) (noting that the “essence of public opinion formation in general lies in 
the distillation or sorting out of frames of reference”). 
72 See Druckman, supra note 10, at 1042 (“Specifically, a framing effect is said to occur 
when, in the course of describing an issue or event, a speaker’s emphasis on a subset of 
potentially relevant considerations causes individuals to focus on these considerations when 
constructing their opinions.”); see also William A. Gamson & Andre Modigliani, Media 
Discourse and Public Opinion on Nuclear Power: A Constructionist Approach, 95 AM. J. SOC. 1, 
3 (1989) (explaining that a frame is a “central organizing idea . . . for making sense of relevant 
events [and] suggesting what is at issue”). 
73 See Druckman, supra note 10, at 1042. 
74 For a depiction of how the use of framing tactics had been widely credited for winning the 
presidential election for the Republicans in 2004, see Matt Bai, The Framing Wars, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 17, 2005, § 6 (Magazine), at 38.  Bai notes: 
As the weeks passed, however, at Washington dinner parties and in public post-
mortems, one explanation took hold not just among Washington insiders but among 
far-flung contributors, activists and bloggers too: the problem wasn’t the substance of 
the party’s agenda or its messenger as much as it was the Democrats’ inability to 
communicate coherently.  They had allowed Republicans to control the language of the 
debate, and that had been their undoing. 
Id. 
75 Kinder & Herzog, supra note 10, at 363. 
76 See Irwin P. Levin et al., All Frames Are Not Created Equal: A Typology and Critical 
Analysis of Framing Effects, 76 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 149, 
150 (1998). 
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James Druckman relates to how individuals view a Ku Klux Klan rally.  
As noted by Druckman, the perceived acceptability of such a rally 
varies, depending upon whether it is framed as a free speech issue or a 
public safety issue.77
3.     Priming 
Priming, like framing, is a technique used to influence attitudes 
and decision outcomes.78  The term “priming” has been used in a 
variety of related ways.  At its most basic, priming is an experimental 
technique by which exposure to a target sensitizes the subject to a later 
presentation of the same or a similar target.  Within a social 
psychological framework, researchers using the priming paradigm have 
found that individuals’ interpretation of information often depends on 
which knowledge structures are currently active.79  Subsequent 
decisions are influenced by those concepts that are most accessible at 
the time that information is processed.80  The accessibility of a 
particular concept—the likelihood that the concept will be retrieved and 
used—is enhanced by prior exposure to the concept.81  Strategic 
priming may be thought of as a two-part process: 
(1) it sets the agenda by focusing public attention on certain topics, 
and (2) it provides the main basis for evaluation. Thus the messages 
communicated significantly influence which attitudes and 
information are likely to be retrieved or accessed from memory and 
incorporated into voters’ judgments about, and ultimate choices of, 
candidates.82
Examining the use and effects of priming reveals a great deal about 
how political candidates structure campaign strategy.83
77 See Druckman, supra note 10, at 1041. 
78 See LUPIA & MCCUBBINS, supra note 3 (distinguishing priming from framing). 
79 See Robert S. Wyer & Thomas K. Srull, Category Accessibility: Some Theoretical and 
Empirical Issues Concerning the Processing of Social Stimulus Information, in SOCIAL 
COGNITION: THE ONTARIO SYMPOSIUM 161 (E. Tory Higgins et al. eds., 1981). 
80 Id.
81 Youjae Yi, The Effects of Contextual Priming in Print Advertisements, 17 J. CONSUMER 
RES. 215, 215 (1990); see also Tory E. Higgins & Gillian A. King, Accessibility of Social 
Constructs: Information Processing Consequences of Individual and Contextual Variability, in
PERSONALITY, COGNITION, AND SOCIAL INTERACTION 69 (Nancy Cantor & John Kihlstrom eds., 
1981). 
82 Lawrence R. Jacobs & Robert Y. Shapiro, Issues, Candidate Image, and Priming: The Use 
of Private Polls in Kennedy’s 1960 Presidential Campaign, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 527, 528 
(1994); see Bianco, supra note 5, at 1068 (describing a voter’s evaluation of a candidate who is 
willing to do whatever it takes to make a favorable impression). 
83 Research on priming offers one approach for conceptually linking the analyses of 
campaign behavior and vote choice.  Incorporating candidate behavior in the study of voters 
would mean treating the influences on vote choices as endogenous to the campaign (i.e., the 
impact of deliberate strategies that candidates pursue in order to win over voters).  See Jacobs & 
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4.     How Candidates Use Priming 
Priming is one of the most commonly discussed psychological 
tactics employed by candidates and political parties in attempts to sway 
voter decision-making.84  Also known as “agenda-setting,” political 
campaign priming leads voters to assign certain issues particular 
importance by focusing on those issues in news coverage and campaign 
ads.85  One example of political agenda-setting occurred in Bill 
Clinton’s 1992 presidential campaign.  Clinton successfully primed the 
issue of the economy, making it the issue upon which many voters 
evaluated the candidates.  Ultimately, many believe that Clinton won 
the election in large part because the weak economy was problematic 
for the incumbent president.86
Priming is an important strategy because as a general matter, the 
electorate is not well-informed about all important political issues.87
When a candidate engages in an attempt to prime particular issues, the 
goal is to place those issues front and center and to increase the 
importance or accessibility of those issues to the voting public.88
Successful priming efforts can change the way voters think about a 
target by creating new cognitive avenues that, in turn, encourage 
positive evaluation.  A candidate who has a favorable voting record on a 
particular issue might concentrate efforts on getting that issue into the 
media: television, print, and radio, as well as devoting considerable 
amounts of time to talking about that particular issue in campaign 
speeches, interviews, and debates.89  Data on issue voting and campaign 
Shapiro, supra note 82; see also Bianco, supra note 5, at 1068. 
84 See, e.g., BARKER, supra note 12; Druckman, supra note 12, at 584-90 (giving an example 
of priming in one election); see also Druckman & Holmes, supra note 12; Druckman et al., supra 
note 12, at 1181. 
85 See Schaffner, supra note 5, at 805 (“As they are set on the agenda, particular issues 
become primed in the minds of voters, meaning that voters give those issues more weight when 
making their vote decisions.”); see also IYENGAR & KINDER, supra note 12; WEST, supra note 
12. 
86 For a time, Bush had the upper hand because of foreign policy developments such as the 
end of the Cold War and the Persian Gulf War.  Clinton’s campaign strategist, James Carville, 
has been credited with focusing efforts on turning the attention of Americans to the economy, 
which had recently undergone a recession.  Richard Alleyne, Gordon Brown: It’s the Economy, 
Stupid!, TELEGRAPH.CO.UK, May 23, 2008, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/ 
byelection/2015038/Gordon-Brown-Its-the-economy-stupid.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2009). 
87 Voters, like people facing other types of decisions, will devote varying amounts of time 
and resources to learning about the positions of various political actors.  See Garrett & Smith, 
supra note 3. 
88 Priming operates on the notion that “changes in the number of stories about an issue affect 
the ingredients of presidential performance evaluations.”  Druckman, supra note 10, at 1043-44. 
89 See Druckman et al., supra note 12, at 1181 (“Candidates engage in priming by 
emphasizing certain issues—by giving those issues more space in their statements—with the goal 
of inducing voters to put more weight on those issues when choosing among candidates.”). 
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communication confirm that emphasizing a particular subset of issues 
influences the importance of those issues to the electorate as a whole.90
Often, one issue will be sufficiently important to a large segment 
of the electorate so as to make it an obvious target for priming for the 
candidate who stands to gain most from that issue’s prominence.91
Candidates and political parties determine which issues will reap the 
greatest benefit by conducting extensive polling.92  Priming achieves 
optimal results when an issue: (1) reaches a certain threshold of 
importance to the voter, and (2) is likely to cast the candidate in a good 
light.  More specifically, priming an issue will benefit a candidate when 
voters approve of the candidate’s handling of the issue,93 when the 
public supports the candidate’s position on the issue,94 or when the 
electorate deems the issue to be important.95
90 See John H. Aldrich & R. Michael Alvarez, Issues and the Presidential Primary Voter, 16 
POL. BEHAV. 289 (1994); John H. Aldrich et al., Foreign Affairs and Issue Voting: Do 
Presidential Candidates “Waltz Before a Blind Audience?,” 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 123-41 
(1989); Steven E. Finkel, Reexamining the “Minimal Effects” Model in Recent Presidential 
Campaigns, 55 J. POL. 1, 2 (1993) (“[E]mpirical studies showed possible increases in the 
electoral effects of campaign-related factors such as candidate personality judgments, media 
coverage, debates, and television advertising.” (citations omitted)).
91 For example, in the 2008 presidential election, much of the campaigning involved a 
candidate’s position on the war in Iraq.  Depending upon how the war was going (or how the 
public perceived the war was going), candidates would selectively prime this issue. 
  More generally, some candidates have engaged in targeted framing, known as political 
narrowcasting.  According to Michael Kang, this strategy involves: (1) identifying every voter 
who might be persuaded to vote for one’s party; (2) approaching each targeted voter with a 
tailored message designed specifically for her (all primed, framed, and ready to go); and (3) 
devoting effort to assuring that every voter who is likely to vote for one’s party turns out on 
election day.  Michael S. Kang, From Broadcasting to Narrowcasting: The Emerging Challenge 
for Campaign Finance Law, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1070, 1070 (2005). 
  Finally, a candidate may target a large swath of the voting public that is particularly likely 
to be swayed in the candidate’s direction and turn up at the polls.  For example, if young people 
are more likely to vote, then we may see issues being primed around financing education, 
whereas if older populations are more likely to vote we may see more issues being primed around 
healthcare, social security benefits, taxes, and so on.  See Druckman et al., supra note 12, at 1182. 
92 See id. at 1181 (“A critical part of the priming strategy involves using public opinion polls 
to pinpoint advantageous issues for the campaign to emphasize.”); see also JOHN G. GEER, FROM 
TEA LEAVES TO OPINION POLLS: A THEORY OF DEMOCRATIC LEADERSHIP (1996). 
93 Joanne M. Miller & Jon A. Krosnick, News Media Impact on the Ingredients of 
Presidential Evaluations: Politically Knowledgeable Citizens Are Guided by a Trusted Source, 44 
AM. J. POL. SCI. 301, 301-02 (2000); see also John R. Petrocik, Issue Ownership in Presidential 
Elections, with a 1980 Case Study, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 825 (1996) (predicting that candidates will 
emphasize issues that will reflect favorably on them). 
94 WILLIAM H. RIKER, THE STRATEGY OF RHETORIC: CAMPAIGNING FOR THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION (Randall L. Calvert et al. eds., 1996); Matthew Mendelsohn, The Media and 
Interpersonal Communications, 58 J. POL. 112, 113-14 (1996). 
95 MICHAEL W. TRAUGOTT & PAUL J. LAVRAKAS, THE VOTER’S GUIDE TO ELECTION POLLS
(2d ed. 2000); Thomas H. Hammond & Brian D. Humes, “What This Campaign Is All About 
Is . . . ”: A Rational Choice Alternative to the Downsian Spatial Model of Elections, in
INFORMATION, PARTICIPATION, AND CHOICE 141, 144 (Bernard Grofman ed., 1st paperback ed. 
1995). 
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Personality traits are often targets of political priming.  Candidates’ 
personal characteristics are interpreted by voters to be indirect measures 
of performance and policy preferences.  For example, while a  
candidate’s record of being strong and decisive in dealing with rogue 
nations has direct implications for the candidate’s future behavior as 
commander-in-chief, public perception of a candidate’s “strength” as a 
leader is influenced by factors other than his or her record, and may be 
particularly susceptible to manipulation.  Demeanor, dress, nonverbal 
behavior, and other aspects of a candidate’s personal appearance have 
important implications for impression formation.  Research has 
indicated the importance of personal impression for candidates,96 and 
recent scholarship suggests that candidates engage in strategic priming 
to influence image perceptions.97  Because negative perceptions of 
personality attributes are often more influential than favorable 
evaluations,98 candidates generally devote more time and resources to 
reversing negative evaluations.  So, if a candidate is viewed by the 
public as being less competent and less strong, but more warm and 
trusting, that candidate is likely to prime those issues that encourage 
favorable strength and competency evaluations, as opposed to those 
geared towards demonstrating trustworthiness or warmth. 
Priming for image enhancement may be accomplished by 
promulgating particular representations of the candidate closely 
associated with images imbued with symbolic meaning.  For example, 
“[a] candidate who seems unapproachable and “cold” may embark on a 
quest to be seen holding (and literally and metaphorically, kissing) as 
many babies as possible.  Repetition of such imagery, particularly if the 
staging is subtle, can influence perceptions in powerful ways.”99
Candidates can also take a more direct approach by priming issues that 
elicit a certain evaluation of the candidate for reasons extraneous to the 
issue itself.  Focusing on certain issues (such as gas prices or taxes for 
96 SAMUEL L. POPKIN, THE REASONING VOTER: COMMUNICATION AND PERSUASION IN 
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS 56 (2d ed. 1994). 
97 Carolyn L. Funk, Bringing the Candidate into Models of Candidate Evaluation, 61 J. POL. 
700, 700 (1999) (“[P]residential campaigns pay a good deal of attention to the development of 
candidate trait images.”); Jacobs & Shapiro, supra note 82, at 527 (“[C]andidates use popular 
policy issues to influence or to ‘prime’ the electorate’s standards for evaluating their personal 
attributes.” (internal parentheses omitted)); Mendelsohn, supra note 94, at 113. 
98 Susan T. Fiske, Attention and Weight in Person Perception, 38 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 889, 891-92 (1980); Richard R. Lau, Two Explanations for Negativity Effects in 
Political Behavior, 29 AM. J. POL. SCI. 119, 121 (1985). 
99 See POPKIN, supra note 96, at 88-89 (arguing that a sitting president can highlight and 
improve perceptions of his strength by campaigning from the White House Rose Garden); see 
also James N. Druckman, The Power of Television Images, 65 J. POL. 559, 569 (2003) (“My 
experiment, comparing television with audio, demonstrates that television images matter—they 
prime people to rely more on personality perceptions when evaluating candidates, which, in turn, 
can affect overall evaluations.”). 
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working-class Americans) can make a candidate seem empathetic,100
while priming issues of personal knowledge or experience can increase 
the publics’ perception that the candidate is competent.101
5.     The Link Between Priming and the Availability Heuristic 
When events, connections, concepts, and risks are easily brought to 
mind, they are said to be “available.”  Research has demonstrated that 
recent or frequent events, and events or depictions that are vivid or 
emotionally loaded, are particularly likely to become cognitively 
available.102  Empirical investigations of the availability heuristic 
suggest that judgments about the relative risk and importance of certain 
events and issues can be heavily influenced by how available 
representative examples are.  For example, prior to the terrorist attack 
on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, Americans were 
relatively unconcerned about terrorism.103  More than a year after the 
attack, public polls revealed that a significant percentage of respondents 
judged terrorism to be the single most important problem, and 
“fluctuations [in Americans’ concern about terrorism] closely track[ed] 
the frequency of television news stories concerning terrorism.”104
Priming and activation of the availability heuristic both capitalize upon 
the fact that voters often use memory-based processing strategies when 
evaluating candidates and issues.105  Candidates prime issues or images 
by repeating them, creating themes, and increasing the cognitive 
availability of the themes and any associated information.106  Political 
100 RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., HOME STYLE (1978). 
101 Patrick Sellers, Strategy and Background in Congressional Campaigns, 92 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 159-71 (1998). 
102 See Wilson & Fuchs, supra note 13, at 2149 (“The availability heuristic is a widely-used 
mental shortcut that leads people to assign a higher likelihood to events that are readily 
‘available’—events that are particularly likely to come to mind due to their vividness, recency, or 
frequency.”). 
103 Cass R. Sunstein, On the Divergent American Reactions to Terrorism and Climate Change, 
107 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 532 (2007) (“[O]n September 10, 2001, terrorism was far from a high 
priority item for Americans—and . . . the year before the attacks, literally 0% of the public 
counted terrorism as the nation’s leading problem!” (citing ROBERT E. GOODIN, WHAT’S WRONG 
WITH TERRORISM? 135 (2006))). 
104 Id.
105 “In particular, the decay of certain effects suggests that voters often use memory-based 
processing strategies when evaluating candidates.”  Daron R. Shaw, A Study of Presidential 
Campaign Event Effects from 1952 to 1992, 61 J. POL. 387, 417 (1999) (looking at the effects of 
messages, party activities, mistakes, and outside occurrences on vote decisions). 
106 Politically and socially motivated actors have been accused of priming and engaging in 
availability campaigns.  McCarthyism has been cited as one example of this: “The anticommunist 
educational campaign and widespread media coverage of world events (primed) an informational 
(availability) cascade . . . [and] such images have been vivid and easily retrieved.”  Christina E. 
Wells, Fear and Loathing in Constitutional Decision-Making, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 115, 179 
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psychologists have noted the effectiveness of such a strategy, finding 
that “information that is widely and repeatedly disseminated to the 
public stands a good chance of being absorbed (and retrieved later).”107
Public interest groups—particularly consumer watchdog and 
environmental groups—have successfully exploited the availability 
heuristic in a variety of situations.108  Political candidates who have 
their own motivation to engage in impression formation may take a 
page out of the same book, developing political strategies modeled on 
those interest group successes.109  While grassroots organizations may 
produce socially beneficial outcomes, such as when such groups 
generate public pressure resulting in the enactment of valuable 
legislation,110 exploitation of the availability heuristic by political 
campaigns is unlikely to serve the public’s interest.  More likely, voters 
are misled when political campaigns focus the public’s attention 
selectively on issues that reflect favorably on a candidate.111  When 
voters selectively focus on certain issues, they may miss the big picture, 
or may ignore a serious weakness in a candidate. 
6.     The Confirmation Bias 
An example of a bias that is particularly likely to influence those 
who vote strictly along party lines is the confirmation bias.  The 
confirmation bias is the tendency to look for information that selectively 
confirms a previously held belief.112  Research on the confirmation bias 
(2005).  For more on informational and reputational cascades, see Timur Kuran & Cass R. 
Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683, 708-09 (1999). 
107 Shaw, supra note 105, at 393; see ZALLER, supra note 66, at 83-84. 
108 For example, following the Exxon-Valdez oil spill, environmental groups, fishermen, and 
members of the tourist industry banded together in a concerted effort to flood the airwaves with 
accounts and images of dying wildlife and oil-soaked beaches.  Another example is the campaign 
launched by the media following the publication of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring in 1962, which 
detailed the harmful effects of DDT.  For more examples of interest groups’ exploitation of the 
availability heuristic, see Wilson & Fuchs, supra note 13, at 2180-206.  See also DEBORAH A.
STONE, POLICY PARADOX AND POLITICAL REASON 106 (1988); Wells, supra note 106, at 169 
n.327 (“[W]ith respect to public policy agenda-setting, . . . ‘groups, individuals, and government 
agencies deliberately and consciously design portrayals so as to promote their favored course of 
action.’” (quoting Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Punitive Damages, Change, and the Politics 
of Ideas: Defining Public Policy Problems, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 71, 76)). 
109 Wilson & Fuchs, supra note 13, at 105. 
110 For more on how interest groups can serve an important role through strategic use of 
availability cascades, see Wilson & Fuchs, supra note 13.  See also Krishnakumar, supra note 3, 
at 530 (explaining that “while the public views lobbyists as soulless mercenaries, skilled at arm-
twisting and bribing legislators into appeasing their clients’ interests at the expense of the public 
good,” members of Congress regard lobbyists as an invaluable source of specialized knowledge). 
111 See infra Part IV. 
112 See generally Clifford R. Mynatt, Michael E. Doherty & Ryan D. Tweney, Consequences 
of Confirmation and Disconfirmation in a Simulated Research Environment, 30 Q.J. 
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 395 (1978). 
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has demonstrated that individuals who are predisposed to a certain 
position or explanation are significantly less likely to generate or be 
receptive to disconfirming or challenging information.113  To the degree 
that a candidate can activate party affiliation in voters, the candidate 
may be able to get voters of the same party to selectively ignore 
potentially damaging information or favorably evaluate ambiguous 
information.114  Accordingly, a candidate who is concerned about a 
decline in support resulting from negative publicity or reputation 
downturn115 may successfully shore up support from self-identified 
members of his or her political party by priming the party, thereby 
triggering the confirmation bias.116
7.     The Dual-Process Model of Decision-Making 
Although discussion of heuristical processing is prevalent in the 
decision-analysis literature, political communication is clearly not 
always a product of cognitive shortcuts.  Whether a message is 
persuasive can also be a function of the quality of the argument.  
According to one theory of persuasion, the central route to persuasion 
involves “a person’s diligent consideration of information that s/he [sic] 
feels is central to the true merits of a particular attitudinal position.”117
However, the peripheral route to persuasion may occur when a message 
is ambiguous, the recipient is overwhelmed, or the context is taxing in 
other aspects.  Under these circumstances, there is an increased reliance 
upon cognitive shortcuts or heuristics to evaluate the value of the 
113 Jennifer Garst et al., Satisficing in Hypothesis Generation, 115 AM. J. PSYCHOL. 475, 476 
(2002) (showing that individuals came up with many fewer hypotheses when they had been 
presented with a single, rational hypothesis than when they had not been presented with a 
hypothesis, in spite of the presence of incentives to generate alternative explanations). 
114 Michael Shermer found that party affiliation predicted confirmation bias in the evaluation 
of information about statements made by George Bush and John Kerry.  See Shermer, supra note 
14, at 37. 
115 For example, a pro-war candidate may anticipate a drop in popularity when there is a 
significant, well-publicized setback in U.S. military efforts oversees.  An example of this is the 
2008 race during which John McCain was closely associated with the Iraq War.  Having been a 
strong advocate for the “surge,” Senator McCain’s popularity was inextricably tied to the 
perceived success of the war effort.  A major setback could have had serious repercussions for his 
candidacy. 
116 Charles G. Lord et al., Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior 
Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098 
(1979); see also Michael A. McCann, It’s Not About the Money: The Role of Preferences, 
Cognitive Biases, and Heuristics Among Professional Athletes, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 1459, 1511-
12 (2006) (citing the confirmation bias in explaining why individuals in a variety of different 
circumstances do not look for disconfirming information). 
117 See Richard E. Petty et al., Central and Peripheral Routes to Advertising Effectiveness: 
The Moderating Role of Involvement, 10 J. CONSUMER RES. 135, 135 (1986). 
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communication.118  In other words, “[a]ttitude changes that occur via 
the peripheral route do not occur because an individual has personally 
considered the pros and cons of the issue, but because the attitude issue 
or object is associated with positive or negative cues—or because the 
person makes a simple inference about the merits of the advocated 
position based on various simple cues in the persuasion context.”119
The elaboration-likelihood model predicts that individuals are 
more likely to pay careful attention to a message and to devote the 
cognitive effort necessary to think through the argument carefully when 
the issue is personally relevant.120  This theory predicts that voters will 
evaluate candidates’ messages and political messages from other 
sources differently, depending upon the level of personal concern about 
the issue involved.  It also suggests that in the midst of a complex 
political race, such as one for the presidency, where numerous issues are 
discussed and communication comes in many forms from many 
sources, there may be an increased tendency for voters to rely upon 
heuristics in evaluating candidates.121
8.     The Role of Emotions in Persuasion 
Political candidates and their proxies are famous (or infamous) for 
harnessing the power of emotional appeals.122  Psychologists have 
accumulated overwhelming evidence that emotions play a significant 
role in how humans form judgments and make choices.123  When 
making decisions, people are often guided by intuition or “gut 
instinct.”124  Research has demonstrated that there are important 
differences between how different emotional states influence 
judgments.125  Sadness and anger, for example, may impact choice-
118 See RICHARD E. PETTY & JOHN T. CACIOPPO, COMMUNICATION AND PERSUASION:
CENTRAL AND PERIPHERAL ROUTES TO ATTITUDE CHANGE (1986). 
119 Petty et al., supra note 117, at 135; see also Shelley Chaiken & D. Maheswaran, Heuristic 
Processing Can Bias Systematic Processing: Effects of Source Credibility, Argument Ambiguity, 
and Task Importance on Attitude Judgment, 66 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 460 (1994). 
120 Richard E. Petty et al., Personal Involvement as a Determinant of Argument-Based 
Persuasion, 41 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 847, 852-53 (1981). 
121 Id.
122 See TED BRADER, CAMPAIGNING FOR HEARTS AND MINDS: HOW EMOTIONAL APPEALS IN 
POLITICAL ADS WORK (2006). 
123 Examples of works on this topic include LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE 
DISSONANCE (1957), and Richard S. Lazarus, Progress on a Cognitive-Motivational-Relational 
Theory of Emotion, 46 AM. PSYCHOL. 819 (1991). 
124 Dan M. Kahan, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Risk Regulation, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 
742 (2008). 
125 Dacher Keltner et al., Culture, Emotion, and the Good Life in the Study of Affect and 
Judgment, 13 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 65, 66 (2002). 
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formation in very different ways.126  So-called “hot-button” issues are 
famously fertile ground for emotional appeals, in part because the topics 
are already associated with various affective states—usually of negative 
valence.127  Pairing messages with emotion-triggering issues can induce 
particular moods that increase the likelihood that the target of the 
message will accept a message.128
Negative emotions, like fear and anger, can have a particularly 
significant effect on behavior.129  Moreover, because negative emotions 
play a central role in the risk-perception context, risk decisions are 
profoundly influenced by the affective component of decision-
making.130  The implications for marketing strategies—political 
marketing and marketing in other forms—are manifold.131 The 
“negative” or “attack” ad may be the most obvious example of the 
connection between emotions and choice in politics.132 The particular 
type of negative emotion elicited can matter a great deal and can result 
in different choices.  As one commentator pointed out: 
Fearful people perceive greater risk across new situations, leading 
them to be risk-averse. Angry people, by contrast, are characterized 
126 Herbert A. Simon, Making Management Decisions: The Role of Intuition and Emotion, 
1 ACAD. MGMT. EXECUTIVE 57 (1987) (“What all of these decision-making situations have in 
common is stress, a powerful force that can divert behavior from the urgings of reason.”). 
127 Keltner et al., supra note 125 (“The core theme of anger, that which differentiates it from 
other negative states, is the unfairness of others’ actions.  In contrast, sadness is defined by the 
sense that fate and circumstances are the cause of one’s current condition.  Fear is defined by 
extreme uncertainty about potentially dangerous outcomes.”).
128 Richard E. Petty et al., Positive Mood and Persuasion: Different Roles for Affect Under 
High- and Low-Elaboration Conditions, 64 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5 (1993); see also
Herbert Bless et al., Mood and Persuasion: A Cognitive Response Analysis, 16 PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 332, 332-46 (1990). 
129 Mary Frances Luce, Choosing to Avoid: Coping with Negatively Emotion-Laden Consumer 
Decisions, 24 J. CONSUMER RES. 409 (1998). 
130 As Dan Kahan notes: 
Distinct emotional states—from fear to dread to anger to disgust—and distinct 
emotional phenomena—from affective orientations to symbolic associations and 
imagery—have been found to explain perceptions of the dangerousness of all manner 
of activities and things—from pesticides to mobile phones, from red meat consumption 
to cigarette smoking. 
Kahan, supra note 124, at 744-45 (footnotes omitted).  Much of the current work in this area is 
based upon that of Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky, who were pioneers in the movement to 
use emotion and culture to explain responses to risk and decision-making more generally.  See, 
e.g., MARY DOUGLAS, RISK AND BLAME: ESSAYS IN CULTURAL THEORY (1992); MARY 
DOUGLAS & AARON B. WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE: AN ESSAY ON THE SELECTION OF 
TECHNOLOGICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL DANGERS (1982); Aaron Wildavsky, Choosing 
Preferences by Constructing Institutions: A Cultural Theory of Preference Formation, 81 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 3 (1987). 
131 See generally Meryl Paula Gardner, Mood States and Consumer Behavior: A Critical 
Review, 12 J. CONSUMER RES. 281 (1985). 
132 Lynda Lee Kaid & Anne Johnston, Negative Versus Positive Television Advertising in U.S. 
Presidential Campaigns, 1960-1988, J. COMM., Summer 1991, at 53; see also STEVEN 
ANSOLABEHERE & SHANTO IYENGAR, GOING NEGATIVE: HOW POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENTS 
SHRINK AND POLARIZE THE ELECTORATE (1995). 
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by a sense of certainty and individual control that leads them to make 
risk-seeking choices. These findings suggest several strategic 
possibilities. Rhetoric that highlights the frightening consequences of 
a particular course of action can be used to block political change if 
it makes the electorate risk-averse. On the other hand, arguments that 
cause citizens to feel angry might inspire them to mobilize for—or 
against—a particular candidate. Because cognitive biases cause 
citizens to give emotionally compelling data disproportionate weight, 
candidates have a strong incentive to counter emotionally laden 
appeals with visceral images of their own.  This tendency to engage 
in tit-for-tat might explain why emotional appeals endure even 
though their repeated use seemingly would have a declining marginal 
effect.133
As this quotation illustrates, psychological findings on the effect of 
emotion on persuasion and attitude change provide fertile ground for 
political strategy.134  A well-funded candidate can pay for consultants 
conversant in the use of fear tactics, as well as focus-group feedback 
from which she can help gauge the reaction of the public to various 
negative-affect-triggering techniques.135  Strategies exploiting positive 
emotions and negative emotions, in order to induce specific reactions, 
may prove strategically beneficial to the candidate, but it is unlikely to 
assist the voter, and in fact may obscure the issues and decrease the 
accuracy of the decision-maker.136
C.     Refuting the Notion that Heuristics Improve Voter Decision-
Making 
For some time, scholars who research voting behavior have 
expressed concern about the voting public’s ability to understand issues 
and cast votes that represent their true intentions.  For instance, when 
voting on a rent-control proposition in California, over three-quarters of 
the electorate either wrongly voted for rent control when they intended 
to oppose it or wrongly voted against rent control when they intended to 
support it.137  As noted above, more than one commentator has 
133 Jennifer Jerit, Survival of the Fittest: Rhetoric During the Course of an Election Campaign, 
25 POL. PSYCHOL. 563 (2004). 
134 John G. Geer, Campaigns, Party Competition, and Political Advertising, in POLITICIANS 
AND PARTY POLITICS 186 (John G. Geer ed., 1998). 
135 Jennifer S. Lerner & Dacher Keltner, Beyond Valence: Toward a Model of Emotion-
Specific Influences on Judgment and Choice, 14 COGNITION & EMOTION 473 (2000). 
136 See generally KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON, DIRTY POLITICS: DECEPTION, DISTRACTION,
AND DEMOCRACY (1992). 
137 In 1980, many voters voting on California Proposition 10 voted in a way that was 
inconsistent with their professed views.  Exit polling revealed that twenty-three percent of voters 
who wished to protect rent control had voted for the anti-rent-control proposition, while fifty-four 
percent of voters who opposed rent-control voted against the proposition. David Butler & Austin 
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suggested that people may be able to make reasonably good voting 
decisions without having a great deal of information upon which to base 
those decisions.138  Indeed, some have suggested that the use of 
cognitive heuristics improves voter decision-making.139  Reliance on 
cues may, in some cases, improve choice formation.140  There is little 
question that heuristics can be helpful in a general sense.141  As 
previously noted, heuristics assist decision-makers in sorting through 
vast quantities of information and in making sensible decisions based on 
a smaller data-set, particularly under time constraints and with limited 
resources.142  However, the tendency of cognitive shortcuts to lead to 
less than optimal decisions has been well documented.143
Ranney, Theory, in REFERENDUMS AROUND THE WORLD: THE GROWING USE OF DIRECT 
DEMOCRACY 11, 18 (David Butler & Austin Ranney eds., 1994) (citing DAVID B. MAGLEBY,
DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT PROPOSITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 141-44 
(1984)); see also Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1556 
(1990). 
138 PAUL M. SNIDERMAN ET AL., REASONING AND CHOICE: EXPLORATIONS IN POLITICAL 
PSYCHOLOGY 1, 19 (1991) (“People can be knowledgeable in their reasoning about political 
choices without necessarily possessing a large body of knowledge about politics.”); see also
Kang, supra note 3, at 1143 (“Despite their rational ignorance, voters can still make competent 
political choices.  They often can use ‘heuristic cues’ as shortcuts to roughly the same 
conclusions that they would have reached had they been well-informed.”). 
139 Kang, supra note 3, at 1141 (“[S]trengthening heuristic cues in direct democracy offers the 
best means of rehabilitating voter competence pragmatically, at low cost, without trying to force 
voters to adjust the way they think about politics.”). 
140 In elections, the classic voting cue is of course the political party.  See ANGUS CAMPBELL 
ET AL., THE AMERICAN VOTER 66-67 (1960).  Others have identified a constellation of cues 
typically associated with voting decisions.  Popkin, for example, has discussed candidate 
demographics, personal attributes, sound bites, and early returns as cues upon which voters rely.  
See POPKIN, supra note 96, at 76.  Voters also look to public statements by elected officials or 
rely upon information provided by supporting interest groups. 
  As previously noted, psychologists have identified a cadre of heuristics that are discussed 
in detail in legal and psychological scholarship.  See, e.g., Jolls et al., supra note 2; see also
Hanson & Kysar, supra note 1, at 637; Alon Harel & Uzi Segal, Criminal Law and Behavioral 
Law and Economics: Observations on the Neglected Role of Uncertainty in Deterring Crime, 1 
AM. L. & ECON. REV. 276 (1999); Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form 
Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203 (2003); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A 
Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571 (1998). 
141 Gerd Gigerenzer & Peter M. Todd, Fast and Frugal Heuristics: The Adaptive Toolbox, in
SIMPLE HEURISTICS THAT MAKE US SMART 3, 27 (Gerd Gigerenzer et al. eds., 1999).  
Gigerenzer and Todd do more than argue that heuristical processing is helpful; they argue that 
fast and frugal decision-making is optimal, asserting that “[b]ounded rationality is neither limited 
optimality nor irrationality.” Id.; see also Wilson & Fuchs, supra note 13, at 2160 (“The 
availability heuristic is a perfect example of a fast and frugal heuristic used in judging risk under 
time constraints and with very little information.”). 
142 See Gigerenzer & Todd, supra note 141, at 28; see also REID HASTIE & ROBYN M.
DAWES, RATIONAL CHOICE IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND 
DECISION MAKING 1 (2001) (“We dominate this planet today because of our distinctive capacity 
for good decision making. . . .  Human beings have an exceptional ability to choose appropriate 
means to achieve their ends.”). 
143 See Jolls et al., supra note 2; Thaler, supra note 9; see also Rachlinski, supra note 140, at 
572-73 (“The hindsight bias thus suggests a problem with the law and economics of negligence.  
If, as many law and economics scholars posit, the common law evolves towards efficiency, then 
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One of the earliest studies that spoke directly to the role of cues 
and heuristics in voter decision-making was Bartels’ 1996 investigation 
of the effects of voter ignorance.144  Bartels examined whether cues and 
“informational shortcuts” improve voter accuracy and concluded that 
although voters do better than chance, they do “significantly less well 
than they would with complete information, despite the availability of 
cues and shortcuts.”145  In another study of voting behavior, Lau and 
Redlawsk investigated voters’ use of five heuristics.  They found that 
reliance on heuristics in presidential campaigns was ubiquitous, and 
more complex issues resulted in a greater reliance on cues.146  Lau and 
Redlawsk’s findings contradicted the notion that heuristics assisted 
uninformed voters in making accurate decisions.  While they did find 
that heuristics were helpful in some cases, it was only the sophisticated 
voters who benefited from using cognitive shortcuts.  Moreover, they 
found that heuristics made relatively unsophisticated members of the 
public less accurate.147  The authors concluded: 
We join in Bartels’ skepticism that voters who are relatively unaware 
of politics can make decisions as if they had full information, simply 
by employing cognitive shortcuts.  Ironically, heuristics are most 
valuable to those who might in fact need them least.  Sophisticated 
voters, who understand the political environment, can use these 
shortcuts to their advantage.  But even they can be misled when the 
political environment is not structured according to their prior 
expectations.148
Other scholars have been skeptical about the public’s ability to use 
heuristics to make “accurate” decisions.  Kuklinski and Quirk have 
reviewed the literature on the impact of heuristics on political opinion 
formation and have concluded that heuristics decrease voter 
competence.149
why does it tolerate biased judgments that create inefficiency?” (citation omitted)); supra notes 
61-64 and accompanying text (discussing prospect theory as an alternative to rational choice 
theory). 
144 See Bartels, supra note 5, at 218 (concluding based upon the data that the notion that the 
voters behaved as if they were fully informed should be “strongly rejected”). 
145 Id. at 217. 
146 See Lau & Redlawsk, supra note 55, at 958-59. 
147 Again, an “accurate” vote is widely understood to be one that the voter would have cast if 
he or she had had all of the relevant information.  See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
148 Lau & Redlawsk, supra note 55, at 966-67 (emphasis added).  The authors note that voters 
who use heuristics are particularly likely to make mistakes when the “outgroup” candidate is 
atypical.  In other words, when a candidate is not a member of the voter’s party of choice, that 
voter may erroneously ignore information that might favor that candidate.  Id. at 964. 
149 See Paul M. Sniderman, Taking Sides: A Fixed Choice Theory of Political Reasoning, in 
ELEMENTS OF REASON: COGNITION, CHOICE, AND THE BOUNDS OF RATIONALITY 67, 78 (Arthur 
Lupia et al. eds., 2000) (arguing that it “seems obvious that ordinary citizens, lacking information 
about politics, are vulnerable to errors in making political choices”).  Mondak has demonstrated 
that respondents use the mention of Reagan’s endorsement in poll questions as a cue to form 
policy preferences.  When Reagan was popular, respondents were particularly likely to support 
WILSON.31-3 3/10/2010 10:11:19 AM 
706 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 31:3 
These findings are unsurprising when considering the relatively 
unsophisticated way in which voters engage in heuristical processing.150
First, the average voter lacks the contextual information necessary to 
know how to accurately apply cues.151  Second, the use of heuristics is 
quite often unconscious, meaning that the voter does not have the 
opportunity to evaluate its appropriateness (assuming that he or she was 
equipped to do so).152  The third reason why voters are unable to 
systematically improve their voting behavior through the use of 
heuristics is that savvy politicians exploit the very mechanisms it has 
been argued may be helpful, as discussed above.  On balance, the 
evidence indicates that voters become less accurate when they rely upon 
heuristics. 
D.     Some Historical Examples of Voter Manipulation 
As previously noted, historical evidence illustrates that candidates 
prime issues favorable to them and engage in other tactics designed to 
shape voting behavior.153  Examining the use of private polls by 
Presidents Kennedy and Nixon, for example, Jacobs and his colleagues 
found that the public statements of both presidents highlighted issues 
that were most likely to resonate with voters.154 Kennedy was 
particularly strategic, according to a 1998 investigation of the former 
president’s campaign tactics.155
[Not only were] the campaign’s positions . . . developed to 
selectively prime voters in order to influence the electorate’s 
standards for evaluating and judging competing office seekers, [but] 
policies he endorsed.  This finding is telling because Reagan’s policies did not vary with his 
popularity.  Therefore, the driving force behind the preference formation was the popularity of the 
source, not the popularity or attractiveness of the policy.  See Mondak, supra note 17.
150 See Kuklinski & Quirk, supra note 3, at 156 (“[P]eople take their heuristics off-the-shelf, 
use them unknowingly and automatically, and rarely worry about their accuracy.”).  For a general 
discussion of heuristical processing, see SIMON, supra note 43 (discussing findings supporting the 
theory of bounded rationality).
151 MICHAEL X. DELLI CAPRINI & SCOTT KEETER, WHAT AMERICANS KNOW ABOUT 
POLITICS AND WHY IT MATTERS 1, 51-53 (1996). 
152 See RICHARD NISBETT & LEE ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE 45 (1980); Mark C. Suchman, On 
Beyond Interest: Rational, Normative and Cognitive Perspectives in the Social Scientific Study of 
Law, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 475, 480. 
153 See JACOBS & SHAPIRO, supra note 31, at 528 (examining the use of private polls by 
presidents Kennedy and Nixon, and citing, for example, that both presidents designed their 
speeches to selectively emphasize the issues that were both concerning to most Americans and 
which reflected favorably on their own agendas). 
154 See id.
155 Id. at 527 (“Archival and interview evidence suggests that Kennedy deliberately used these 
popular issues to shape the electorate’s standards for evaluating his personal attributes, rather than 
to win over utility-maximizing voters.  We conclude that the study of priming offers one 
important approach to reintegrating research on candidate strategy and voter behavior.”). 
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the Kennedy campaign used salient, accessible issues in order to 
construct an appealing image of the candidate as competent and 
caring, an image that diverged quite noticeably (and favorably) from 
that of his opponent.156
A critical aspect of Kennedy’s strategy was to emphasize a few 
salient issues so as to render these issues “available” to voters.157
Kennedy’s campaign team hoped to shape the electorate’s standards for 
evaluating the candidates. Ultimately, Kennedy managed to construct a 
positive image of himself that was noticeably divergent from that of 
Nixon.158  Although Nixon lost to Kennedy in the 1960 election, he was 
no stranger to the mind-control game.  Nixon also relied on polling to 
craft message and shape opinion.  His team created 233 private surveys, 
a number that exceeded the number of surveys assembled by his 
presidential contemporaries by a substantial margin.159  Nixon has been 
credited with paving the way for the current tendency of candidates and 
sitting presidents to rigorously monitor public opinion.160
Often, politicians will attempt to capitalize upon events that are 
exogenous to their campaign.  Clinton was able to capitalize upon just 
such an opportunity prior to the 1992 presidential election.  During the 
Gulf War, George Bush enjoyed tremendous popularity among the 
American public.  Following the war, when many Americans turned 
their attention to the lagging economy, Clinton exploited this change to 
great advantage, with the help of a team of artful rhetoricians and 
strategists.161  Some commentators have voiced doubts that the 
Democrats could have triumphed in the 1992 election had they not 
capitalized upon the then-current changing tide.162
A more recent example of a political candidate capitalizing upon 
current concerns of the populace was Barack Obama’s use of the Iraq 
156 See id. at 529. 
157 See id. (noting that Kennedy chose “accessible” issues in order to influence voters’ 
memories). 
158 Id.
159 The number of Nixon surveys exceeded those of Kennedy by a factor of more than ten, and 
Johnson by a factor of nearly two.  Lawrence R. Jacobs & Robert Y. Shapiro, The Rise of 
Presidential Polling: The Nixon White House in Historical Perspective, 59 PUB. OPINION Q. 163, 
167 (1995). 
160 See id.
161 James Carville is credited for keeping the voting public focused on the economic issues 
during this time.  In order to keep the campaign on message, Carville hung a sign in Bill Clinton’s 
Little Rock campaign headquarters that highlighted three points: 
1.  Change vs. more of the same; 
2.  It’s the economy, stupid; 
3.  Don’t forget health care. 
Alleyne, supra note 86. 
162 Cf. Jon A. Krosnick & Laura A. Brannon, The Impact of the Gulf War on the Ingredients of 
Presidential Evaluations: Multidimensional Effects of Political Involvement, 87 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 963 (1993) (examining the role of priming in George Bush’s dramatic increase in approval 
ratings during the Gulf War). 
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War.  In the 2008 primary, Obama frequently engaged in priming the 
voting public, positioning the war front-and-center at every opportunity.  
Although his anti-war position was similar to that of his opponent 
Hillary Clinton, Obama created the impression of a substantial 
distinction by repeatedly harkening back to Clinton’s initial vote 
authorizing George W. Bush to send troops to Iraq.163  Although he was 
not in the United States Senate at the time of the congressional vote to 
authorize the use of force, Obama skillfully created the impression that 
his failure to vote for such authorization was a result of choice rather 
than of lack of opportunity,164 suggesting that he had taken a 
dramatically different approach and diverging from his opponent’s 
position at the time.  By emphasizing that he had never voted to 
authorize the use of force, Obama attempted to shift focus away from a 
perceived deficit on his part with respect to foreign policy experience.165
Hillary Clinton engaged in her own attempts to shape voter 
cognitions.  A particularly memorable example was Hillary Clinton’s 
use of the “3:00 a.m.” phone call political advertisement during the 
primary.166  Clinton’s primary strategy was to play up her experience—
163 The Washington Post cited Obama as delivering “some of his strongest statements against 
Hillary Clinton’s stance on the war in Iraq” for having voted in 2002 to authorize the use of force: 
  “I have been open about my reasons for opposing the war, but one of my opponents 
in this race, Senator Clinton, has tried, I believe, to rewrite history,” Obama said at a 
roundtable discussion on veterans [sic] issues with several military officers here.  “She 
voted for a resolution called and I quote, ‘a resolution to authorize the use of the 
United States Armed Forces again [sic] Iraq,’ and now she is saying that she wasn’t 
really voting for war.  She cast her vote after failing to read the National Intelligence 
Estimate on Iraq . . . which raised enough doubts for the majority of Democratic 
senators who read it that they voted against the war.  We need accountability in our 
leaders.  You can’t undo a vote for war just because a war stops being popular.” 
Alec MacGillis, Obama Slams Clinton’s War Vote, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, Jan. 24, 2008, 
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2008/01/24/obama_slams_clintons_war_vote_1.html. 
164 It certainly is plausible that Barack Obama would have voted against authorizing the use of 
force; however, it is impossible to know for sure, a fact that is belied by his rhetoric at the time.  
Obama’s success with this strategy is evidence of a phenomenon akin to a neglect of probability 
bias, in which the original probability of an occurrence is miscalculated, misremembered, or 
ignored.  JONATHAN BARON, THINKING AND DECIDING 260-61 (3d ed. 2000). 
165 On the campaign trail, Clinton claimed that Obama was dangerously inexperienced in the 
area of foreign policy.  For example, in a campaign speech at George Washington University: 
[Clinton] assailed rival Sen. Barack Obama, D-Ill., as unwise, inexperienced, impulsive 
and indecisive—in short, a risk to the nation . . . .  With a half-dozen retired generals 
standing behind her, Clinton said she was the only candidate who could restore a U.S. 
foreign policy that had the right combination of diplomacy and military might. 
Jake Tapper & Eloise Harper, Clinton Blasts Obama’s Foreign Policy Readiness, ABC NEWS, 
Feb. 25, 2008, http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/Vote2008/story?id=4340399. 
  It is important to note that the Iraq War was already an important issue during the 2007-
2008 primary race.  Obama’s efforts to make the war a primary focus of the election were 
additive.  However, Obama was effective in keeping the public’s eye focused on the issue of the 
war through sustained efforts to maintain the topic as a central issue. 
166 See YouTube, Hillary and Her “Red Phone,” http://www.youtube.com/watch?v= 
kddX7LqgCvc (last visited Jan. 26, 2010). 
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particularly with respect to foreign policy issues—and to emphasize 
Obama’s relative inexperience.  Her slogan was “Ready to Lead on Day 
One.”167  The “red phone” ad was one of the most dramatic examples of 
the exploitation of the availability heuristic during the 2007-2008 
primary season.  The opening scene features the outside of a house at 
nighttime.  There is the sound of a phone ringing, and a voice-over says: 
“It’s 3:00 a.m. and your children are safe and asleep.”  The camera shot 
changes to feature a young child sleeping.  Several additional children 
are shown sleeping in their beds, while the voice-over continues: “But 
there’s a phone in the White House, and it’s ringing.  Something’s 
happening in the world.  Your vote will decide who answers that call; 
whether it’s someone who already knows the world’s leaders, knows the 
military—someone tested and ready to lead in a dangerous world.”  The 
persistent sound of the phone ringing accompanied by the image of 
vulnerable young children sleeping in their beds and the suggestion that 
a world emergency is taking place created a vivid scene.168  The 
advertisement seemed to have the very effect predicted by those who 
write about the availability heuristic.  It was widely discussed, and 
although the message conveyed precisely what Clinton had been openly 
and repeatedly saying, it was nonetheless deemed objectionable by 
some.  The interest, both positive and negative, that it generated was 
most likely a product of the advertisement’s power and the lasting 
impression it created. 
If the concern about campaign expenditures is based on the notion 
that wealthy interests gain too much control over the election process, 
Barack Obama’s 2008 presidential race might suggest a different model.  
Obama’s campaign was the most well-funded in American history; he 
spent record amounts, and he achieved victory.169  Rather than 
depending primarily upon corporations, wealthy individuals, and 
interest groups, Obama’s campaign was notable with respect to the level 
of support it garnered from small donors.170 One news outlet 
167 For a discussion of Clinton’s campaign theme and the Obama camp’s response to attacks 
on his perceived inexperience, see Posting of Susan Rice to the Huffington Post (Dec. 26, 2007, 
16:56), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/susan-rice/ready-to-lead-on-day-one_b_78339.html. 
168 See supra note 166. 
169 The campaign revealed that it raised an impressive $150 million in the single month of 
September.  See NPR News Morning Edition: Obama’s $150 Million Changing Rules of the 
Game (National Public Radio broadcast Oct. 20, 2008) (transcript available at
http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=95882376). 
170 See Michael Luo, Obama’s September Success Recasts the Campaign Fund-Raising 
Landscape, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2008, at A21 (modified version available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/20/us/politics/20donate.html?_r=1).  In September, Obama’s 
Campaign Manager, David Plouffe, announced that the $150 million raised in September 
represented an average donation of less than $100, and that 632,000 new donors had made 
contributions in that month.  Id. But see Press Release, The Campaign Finance Institute, Reality
Check: Obama Received About the Same Percentage from Small Donors in 2008 as Bush in 2004 
(Nov. 24, 2008), http://www.cfinst.org/pr/prRelease.aspx?ReleaseID=216.
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commented that “Obama’s campaign has repeatedly demonstrated an 
ability to raise millions in small-dollar donations in a matter of hours 
over the Internet, almost at will.”171  Obama credited his small donors 
for his campaign’s success via videotaped messages, telling them: 
“Instead of forcing us to rely on millions from Washington lobbyists 
and special interest PACs, you’ve fueled this campaign with donations 
of $5, $10, $20, whatever you can afford.”172  When the source of 
campaign funds is many small donors rather than a wealthy few, 
concerns associated with unlimited spending arguably decrease.173
However, the likelihood that this type of fundraising will be 
accomplished by future candidates is far from certain, given the unique 
combination of factors at work during the 2008 election cycle.174
II. HOW CAMPAIGN DOLLARS CHANGE VOTING OUTCOMES
In writing about campaign spending limits, many commentators 
have operated on the assumption that campaign money impacts vote 
outcomes.  In fact, it has been said that “[t]he first deadly sin of 
unregulated political money is that of unequal influence.”175  The 
171 Brian C. Mooney, In a Shift, Obama Rejects Public Funding, BOSTON GLOBE, June 20, 
2008, at A1, available at http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2008/06/20/in_a_shift_ 
obama_rejects_public_funding/.
172 See Adam Nagourney & Jeff Zeleny, Obama Forgoes Public Funds in First for Major 
Candidate, N.Y. TIMES ON THE WEB, June 20, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/20/us/ 
politics/20obamacnd.htm. 
173 The topic of Obama’s campaign, and the implications for campaign financing and public 
funding, is the subject of a forthcoming companion essay. 
174 For example, America was embroiled in an unpopular war and was experiencing a serious 
financial recession.  Public approval ratings for outgoing president George W. Bush and his 
administration were at all-time lows (ranging from 20-30% approving).  There were a number of 
additional factors at work, an examination of which goes beyond the scope of the current 
discussion.  For more on the Obama fundraising phenomenon, see Molly J. Walker Wilson, The 
New Role of the Small Donor in Political Campaigns and the Demise of Public Funding, 25 J.L.
& POL. (forthcoming Feb. 2010). 
175 See, e.g., Frank Askin, Political Money and Freedom of Speech: Kathleen Sullivan’s Seven 
Deadly Sins—An Antitoxin, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1065, 1069 (1998) (stating that the regime 
created by Buckley inappropriately enables large contributors to affect the democratic process); 
Paul Steinhauser & Mark Preston, Obama Announces Big June Haul, CNN.COM, July 17, 2008, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/07/17/obama/index.html (“Money, of course, is not the 
only factor in the campaign, but it does pay for advertisements on television, radio and the 
Internet and in print, as well as expensive get-out-the-vote efforts in crucial battleground states.”); 
see also Edwin C. Baker, Campaign Expenditures and Free Speech, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
1, 43-44 (1998) (expressing concern about inappropriate—wealth—influences on public opinion); 
Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, The Constitutional Imperative and Practical Superiority of 
Democratically Financed Elections, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1160, 1163-65 (1994) [hereinafter 
Raskin & Bonifaz, Democratically Financed Elections] (criticizing Buckley for its deviation from 
the fundamental principle of democratic equality); Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, Equal 
Protection and the Wealth Primary, 11 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 273, 274-75, 277 (1993) 
[hereinafter Raskin & Bonifaz, Wealth Primary] (concerning what will happen “[w]hen the logic 
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intuitive notion that money ultimately does influence voting behavior 
has been demonstrated empirically.176  Moreover, there is some 
evidence that the relationship between money spent and success in the 
polls is linear.177  Empirical evidence from the past twenty years would 
tend to support what commentators have intuited since the early part of 
the past century: Campaign expenditures influence election outcomes in 
profound and substantial ways.  To some, this influence is deeply 
troubling.  As Edward McChesney Sait wrote in 1929: 
It is an assumption which can be supported by impressive 
evidence, and which political experts, familiar with that 
evidence, will be disposed to admit: campaign expenditures, in 
many parts of this country, tend to be not only excessive but 
also corrupt.  This corruption is particularly noxious because it 
affects the very foundations of the democratic process.178
A.     Contradicting the “Minimal Effects” View of Campaigning 
The link between money and vote outcomes has not received 
unilateral acceptance.  One group questioning the existence of this 
relationship is that of political scientists belonging to the “minimal 
effects” school of thought.179  Those who subscribe to a minimal effects 
view of political campaigning argue that political opinion is to a large 
degree stable, rendering campaign efforts largely ineffective and 
superfluous.180   Proponents of this perspective maintain that 
campaigning has minimal effects on the outcome of a political race.181
Ironically, research on cognitive processes has been cited in support of 
the notion that campaigns fail to influence vote decisions.182  However, 
of the market—everything is for sale and the highest bidder wins—overrides the political 
principle of one person/one vote”); Wright, supra note 25, at 625-26 (“Political equality is the 
cornerstone of American democracy.  Today’s electoral processes, tainted by huge inequalities in 
funds and special access for special interests, fall far short of that ideal and are moving further 
away every year.”). 
176 A relationship has been found between spending and election outcomes.  Where an 
incumbent wins, for example, the more the challenger spends, the smaller the incumbent’s margin 
of victory.  See Glantz et al., supra note 15, at 1037-38. 
177 Id.
178 Edward McChesney Sait, Campaign Expenditures, 23 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 47 (1929). 
179 See Shaw, supra note 105, at 388 (“The conventional wisdom has it that campaigns 
produce ‘minimal effects’ in presidential elections.”); see also D. Sunshine Hillygus, Campaign 
Effects and the Dynamics of Turnout Intention in Election 2000, 67 J. POL. 50, 52 (2005).
180 See, e.g., Finkel, supra note 90, at 1 (“Until recently, political scientists viewed presidential 
campaigns as having relatively minor effects on voters and electoral outcomes.”); Richard L. 
Hasen, Campaign Finance Laws and the Rupert Murdoch Problem, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1627, 1641 
(1999) (“Endorsement decisions . . . often may have very little, if any, effect on the outcome of 
races.”). 
181 See generally WEST, supra note 12; Finkel, supra note 90.
182 One writer has argued: 
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the claim that campaigns have minimal effects on voting behavior is 
increasingly being challenged.183  As one commentator explained, 
“campaigns perform a critical ‘informing’ function, and they ‘help 
voters decide to vote for the candidate we would expect them to vote for 
based on their political predispositions.’”184  Even scholars who 
downplay the importance of political strategy often admit that 
campaigns can create power effects.185  Data suggests that when 
candidates invest resources in pre-election efforts, they often reap the 
rewards.  One investigation found that “[o]f the thirty-one presidential 
elections held from 1860 through 1980, the winner outspent the loser 
[twenty-two] out of [thirty-one] times.  If we focus just on open races, 
those with no incumbent running, the winner outspent the loser in 
[eleven] out of [twelve] races.”186
Scholars studying the impact of priming on voting behavior have 
specifically challenged the “minimal effects” theory.187  According to 
priming experts, citizen evaluations of politicians have been shown to 
be affected in important ways following targeted priming (through 
media coverage or candidate discussion) of particular policy areas.188
As one commentator puts it, “[t]hrough the agenda-setting effect, 
[A] source of . . . stability [of political views] lies in commonplace cognitive biases.  
For example, one form of cognitive bias identified in numerous studies is a kind of 
selective attention that causes people to attend most carefully to information with 
which they are already familiar or with which they already agree, and to ignore 
unfamiliar or challenging information.  Another kind of cognitive bias causes voters to 
misinterpret information to which they do attend so as to make it seem more consistent 
with their existing beliefs than is actually the case.  Both of these biases work against 
the possibility of persuasion during election campaigns. 
James A. Gardner, Deliberation or Tabulation? The Self-Undermining Constitutional 
Architecture of Election Campaigns, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 1413, 1473-74 (2007). 
183 A number of empirical studies have demonstrated that voters are influenced by such 
campaign factors as television advertising and news coverage.  See, e.g., ANSOLABEHERE &
IYENGAR, supra note 132, at 17-18; THOMAS M. HOLBROOK, DO CAMPAIGNS MATTER? (1996); 
Shaw, supra note 105, at 388-89. 
184 Dennis F. Thompson, Two Concepts of Corruption: Making Campaigns Safe for 
Democracy, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1036, 1050 n.61 (2005) (quoting HOLBROOK, supra note 
183, at 17). 
185 See Finkel, supra note 90, at 17-19 (finding support for an “activation” model of campaign 
effects in which the campaigns served to activate existing political predispositions, and asserting 
the potential for substantially greater campaign effects). 
186 David C. Nice, Research Note, Campaign Spending and Presidential Election Results, 19 
POLITY 464, 468 (1987).  For a discussion of the effects of money and campaigning, see Glantz et 
al., supra note 15, at 1036.  See also GARY JACOBSON, MONEY IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS
(1980).  See generally, STEPHEN WAYNE, THE ROAD TO THE WHITE HOUSE (1980); Burton 
Abrams & Russell Settle, The Economic Theory of Regulation and Public Financing of 
Presidential Elections, 86 J. POL. ECON. 245, 248 (1978); W.P. Welch, The Effectiveness of 
Expenditures in State Legislative Races, 4 AM. POL. Q. 333 (1976). 
187 See, e.g., Druckman et al., supra note 12 (arguing that priming is an important and 
effective strategy); see also Iyengar & Simon, supra note 6, at 150 (“Campaigns do matter and 
can be pivotal.  In the current regime, the consequences of campaigns are far from minimal.”). 
188 See Druckman et al., supra note 12; see also IYENGAR & KINDER, supra note 12. 
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campaigns lead citizens to consider some issues more important than 
others by focusing more on those issues in news coverage and campaign 
ads.”189  Other researchers have systematically uncovered a variety of 
methodological constraints that have resulted in misleading data.190  As 
one investigator noted: 
Previous research on campaigns has often been limited by the 
available data.  Moreover, the way the data have been collected and 
analyzed has had a profound impact on the way that campaign 
effects are conceived.  Much of this research relies on data that 
measures presidential campaigns as monolithic, time-invariant events 
that have the same average effect for all people during all points of 
the campaign.  Clearly, the campaign is not so simplistic.191
Proponents of a more sophisticated approach have blamed 
simplified measures and an over-reliance on an outcome-driven analysis 
for yielding misleading data.192  More recent attempts to gauge effects 
of campaign events in presidential and other races have increased in 
sophistication.  A number of empirical investigations have yielded 
support for the notion that campaigning does influence voter decision-
making.193  Investigators have found that campaign strategy affects 
voters’ decision-making, and specifically with respect to priming and 
framing, empirical investigations have found support for the 
effectiveness of these tactics.194  Specifically, research has 
demonstrated that agenda-setting (priming) has affected the importance 
voters assign to particular issues.195  Framing and targeting particular 
audiences also seem to be successful campaign strategies that yield real 
189 See Schaffner, supra note 5, at 805 (discussing how priming “women’s issues” leads more 
women to vote the democratic ticket); see also Finkel, supra note 90, at 17-19. 
190 See Iyengar & Simon, supra note 6, at 151 (highlighting certain methodological 
constraints, including limiting the investigation to “persuasion effects” and relying on survey data 
and self-report measures). 
191 D. Sunshine Hillygus & Simon Jackman, Voter Decision Making in Election 2000: 
Campaign Effects, Partisan Activation, and the Clinton Legacy, 47 AM. J. POL. SCI. 583, 584 
(2003) (internal citation omitted); see also id. at 583 (finding that campaign effects surface when 
“richer” sources of data are mined). 
192 See HOLBROOK, supra note 183, at 153 (“Campaign effects are unlikely to be found by 
analyzing only ultimate vote decisions or election outcomes.  A political campaign must be 
understood to be a process that generates a product, the election outcome, and like any other 
process, one cannot expect to understand the process by analyzing only the product.”). 
193 For example, Robert Hurd and Michael Singletary found an effect for endorsements among 
independent voters in the 1980 presidential election.  The study used National Election Studies 
data and found a small, but statistically significant effect.  Robert E. Hurd & Michael W. 
Singletary, Newspaper Endorsement Influence on the 1980 Presidential Election Vote, 61 
JOURNALISM Q. 332, 335 (1984), cited in Hasen, supra note 180, at 1655 n.148. 
194 Specifically, research has revealed that campaigning can influence which issues voters rate 
as most important, how voters evaluate candidates, and whether citizens vote at all.  See 
ANSOLABEHERE & IYENGAR, supra note 132, at 278; Lau & Redlawsk, supra note 55. 
195 Maxwell E. McCombs & Donald L. Shaw, The Agenda Setting Function of Mass Media, 
36 PUB. OPINION Q. 176 (1972) (finding a correlation between which issues were presented to the 
voting public through the media and which issues the voters found important).
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d these issues.197
results in terms of influencing voting behavior.  For instance, when 
campaigns focused more on women’s issues, women became more 
likely to vote for the Democratic candidate, while voting behavior of 
men was unaffected.196  Nelson and Kinder have demonstrated ways in 
which politicians can employ alternative frames for issues ranging from 
welfare to affirmative action to AIDS policy, and how manipulating 
these frames can influence the relative importance of certain predictors 
of opinion towar
One apparent explanation for why campaigning matters is that 
Americans have become less likely to vote strictly along party lines.198
When the only cue voters rely upon is political party membership, 
campaign efforts yield marginal effects. With the decline of partisanship 
and the burgeoning of the independent voter, campaign tactics have 
become increasingly influential.199  The good news is that while 
undecided voters are especially likely to be influenced by some forms of 
exploitative campaign tactics, partisan neutrality may make these 
individuals less vulnerable to other types of manipulation. 
Compelling evidence of the effect of campaigning comes from a 
study by Shaw that relied upon cross-sectional and pooled time-series 
models of candidate support as related to the candidates’ television 
advertising and personal appearances during the 1988, 1992, and 1996 
presidential campaigns.200  Findings revealed a positive correlation 
between a candidate’s campaign activities in a particular state and 
votes.201  Specifically, data gathered weekly demonstrated a significant 
relationship between statewide support and campaigning. Shaw 
concluded that “[c]ampaign effects . . . appear to have been both direct 
and conditioned by the receptivity of the electorate.”202
196 See generally Schaffner, supra note 5. 
197 See Nelson & Kinder, supra note 66, at 1057; see also Druckman, supra note 10, at 1044. 
198 See generally MARTIN P. WATTENBERG, THE DECLINE OF AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES
(1986); MARTIN P. WATTENBERG, THE RISE OF CANDIDATE-CENTERED POLITICS (1991) 
(documenting the decline in partisanship in America); see also NORMAN NIE ET AL., THE 
CHANGING AMERICAN VOTER (1976).  Moreover, party affiliation does not always indicate a 
candidate’s position on an issue.  See Heather K. Gerken, Shortcuts to Reform, 93 MINN. L. REV. 
1582, 1594 (2009) (“[P]artisan cues do not provide a dependable heuristic for voters in the 
context of election reform.”). 
199 See Shaw, supra note 105, at 389. 
200 Donald R. Shaw, The Effect of TV Ads and Candidate Appearances on Statewide 
Presidential Votes, 1988-96, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 345 (1999). 
201 Id. at 356-57. 
202 Id. at 357. 
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B.     Evidence That Activation of Biases Is Not Passive 
Hanson and Kysar recently suggested that the decision-making 
process is more complex than the traditional model might suggest.203
Behavioral decision theorists have typically conceived of heuristics and 
biases as operating automatically in a fixed manner.  Rather than 
viewing the decision-making process as static, Hanson and Kysar 
proposed a dynamic model in which the decision-maker is influenced 
by external forces that trigger or exaggerate various biases.  In a seminal 
article discussing exploitation of heuristics and biases in the 
marketplace, Hanson and Kysar proposed that “[c]onsumers are subject 
to a host of cognitive biases which, particularly when taken together, 
appear to render them vulnerable to manipulation.”204  Hanson and 
Kysar further argued that “manipulation of consumers by manufacturers 
is not simply a possibility in light of the behavioral research but it is an 
inevitable result of the competitive market.”205  In order to compete in 
the marketplace, manufacturers must take advantage of the profit 
maximizing opportunities that heuristics and biases present.206  In a 
companion article, Hanson and Kysar presented empirical evidence of 
market manipulation.207  They concluded that manufacturers routinely, 
and with significant skill, manipulate consumer perception to maximize 
their own benefit.208
Hanson and Kysar are not alone in claiming that commercial actors 
demonstrate a sophistication about cognitive phenomena that is 
sometimes underestimated and that the strategic exploitation of this 
information is inevitable.209  For example, legal scholars have discussed 
203 See Hanson & Kysar, supra note 1, at 636. 
204 Id. at 723. 
205 Id. at 726. 
206 Id.
207 Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of 
Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420, 1466 (1999).  In their article, Hanson and Kysar 
present the following claim: 
Although the preceding evidence is far from systematic, we believe that it supports our 
basic claim that manufacturers manipulate consumer perceptions.  The markets that we 
have described as evincing manufacturer manipulation—food products, pharmaceutical 
drugs, environmental pollutants, weapons, and automobiles—are all markets in which 
one would surmise intuitively that consumers are at least somewhat aware of the fact 
that health and safety issues are implicated by the product.  When consumers are at 
least partially aware of health and safety risks, manufacturers have incentives to 
manipulate risk perceptions in the manner that benefits them most . . . .” 
Id. 
208 See Hanson & Kysar, supra note 207, at 1572. 
209 For another article that looks at strategic behavior based upon knowledge of heuristics and 
biases in the products liability area, see Daniel Schwarcz, A Products Liability Theory for the 
Judicial Regulation of Insurance Policies, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1389, 1437 (2007) (“[F]irms 
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ways in which the credit card industry has learned to manipulate 
psychological and sociological forces for its benefit.210  Commentators 
writing in the area of intellectual property have argued that 
“infringement and dilution are best understood as commercial behavior 
that manipulates the cognitive biases of consumers, and as such 
threatens to render their heuristic judgments persistently inaccurate.”211
Even sports teams have been accused of manipulating the biases of the 
public for gain.212  Hanson and Kysar suggest that competition in the 
marketplace provides sufficient incentives so as to induce market actors 
to exploit heuristics and biases, even if those actors do not fully 
understand the underlying theory of cognitive mechanisms.213
However, much of the empirical evidence suggests that often the 
manipulation is deliberate and intentional.214
Although Hanson and Kysar’s project focused on products 
liability, they emphasize the universality of this marketplace 
phenomenon.215  During campaigns, candidates act in the political 
marketplace just as others act in the marketplace for goods, identifying 
and exploiting heuristics and biases.216  In thinking about the features of 
competitive markets it is clear that competing for votes—particularly in 
a national election—involves pressures that in many ways parallel 
have a natural competitive incentive to manipulate these biases through advertising and other 
marketing techniques that cause consumers to underestimate product risks.”).  See also John E. 
Montgomery, Cognitive Biases and Heuristics in Tort Litigation: A Proposal to Limit Their 
Effects Without Changing the World, 85 NEB. L. REV. 15, 33 (2006) (“These groups are driven by 
competitive pressure to actively manipulate consumer risk perception in a way advantageous to 
product marketers; advertising is the vehicle to accomplish this result.”). 
210 David K. Stein, Wrong Problem, Wrong Solution: How Congress Failed the American 
Consumer, 23 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 619, 627 (2007) (“Credit card issuers have been able to 
manipulate and persuade consumers—using their knowledge of these forces—through advertising 
and other marketing techniques.”).
211 Jeremy N. Sheff, The (Boundedly) Rational Basis of Trademark Liability, 15 TEX. INTELL.
PROP. L.J. 331, 334 (2007). 
212 See generally McCann, supra note 116. 
213 See Hanson & Kysar, supra note 1, at 726. 
214 See Hanson & Kysar, supra note 207, at 1537. 
215 See Hanson & Kysar, supra note 1, at 637 (“The problem of market manipulation has 
implications for a broad range of legal issues.”).  The article focuses on products liability for three 
reasons: 
First, products liability scholarship is dominated by law and economics theory which is 
premised on a rational actor model of human behavior.  Second, the issue of whether, 
and to what extent, consumers are able to acquire and comprehend product risk 
information has assumed a position of utmost importance to products liability theory.  
Finally, because consumer product purchases generally are the most frequent and 
familiar market transactions that any of us experience, an examination of the consumer 
product context provides a relevant, immediate, and accessible way to explore our 
more general thesis about market manipulation. 
Id. at 637-38. 
216 It has been noted by many commentators that within government and the public sector, 
representations of particular courses of action are carefully crafted in such a fashion so as to 
promote a favored outcome.  See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
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instincts.”223
III.     THE STORY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM
A.     The Goals of Campaign Finance Reform 
competition for consumers in the products marketplace.  “Moreover, 
public choice theory assumes that all players in the local decision-
making process—elected officials, bureaucrats, business interests, 
lobbyists, neighborhood groups, and others—will act in the political 
marketplace as actors in the private, financial marketplace do: in their 
own self-interest.”217 Given the tight competition and high stakes 
involved in national elections, it is logical that candidates employ 
strategic tactics aimed at manipulating voters’ decision-making 
processes.  As Iyengar and Simon found, “manipulation . . . to promote 
political objectives is now not only standard practice but in fact 
essential to survival.”218
According to Hanson and Kysar, the party who is in the best 
position to control the flow of information and the presentation of 
options is the party who ultimately has the most power to shape future 
decisions.219  The potential for any given candidate to gain too much 
control over information flow would appear to justify spending 
limits.220  As Hanson and Kysar point out, “when a party to a 
transaction has the ability to assert this influence, the underlying 
transaction will not necessarily yield an increase in social welfare.”221
Even in the context of a presidential election, when citizens are more 
active, more likely to vote, and better informed about the candidates, 
voters are still often confused regarding policy issues.  Levels of voter 
comprehension of policy decisions are sufficiently low that scholars 
have debated whether voters are even competent to respond to policy 
rhetoric in any meaningful way.222  This problem is compounded when 
“[a]ny efforts at self education are thwarted by manipulative campaigns 
designed to oversimplify the issues and appeal to the electorate’s worst 
217 Matthew J. Parlow, Civic Republicanism, Public Choice Theory, and Neighborhood 
Councils: A New Model for Civic Engagement, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 137, 146 (2008). 
218 See Iyengar & Simon, supra note 6, at 150 (emphasis added). 
219 See Hanson & Kysar, supra note 1, at 635. 
220 For articles that discuss various positions on campaign finance reform, see Lau & 
Redlawsk, supra note 55, and Dennis F. Thompson, Two Concepts of Corruption: Making 
Campaigns Safe for Democracy, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1036, 1057-58 (2005). 
221 See Hanson & Kysar, supra  note 1, at 747. 
222 See Eule, supra note 137, at 1556. 
223 See id.
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sue.  On the other hand, the 
legis
 one notable exception) rejected the 
notio
e 
expe
While most agree that there should be some regulation governing 
campaign dollars, there is disagreement with respect to questions of 
scope, degree, and means.224  Broadly speaking, there are two potential 
pitfalls.  On the one hand, the legislature could be too restrictive, 
creating laws that unconstitutionally restrict the ability of actors to 
support a candidate or promote an is
lature could under-regulate and could fail to adequately protect the 
voters from inappropriate influences.225
The Supreme Court has consistently held that restrictions on 
campaign funding implicate the First Amendment and have thus 
required the showing of a compelling interest to outweigh protection of 
speech.  The Court has held that “corruption or the appearance of 
corruption” is a sufficiently compelling interest to justify burdening 
speech and association freedoms.226  Throughout its campaign finance 
jurisprudence, the Court has (with
n that equalizing the political field is an interest justifying 
regulation of campaign monies.227
The Court has likewise failed to recognize the potential for 
campaign spending to mislead voters or to distort voting decisions.  The 
Court’s recognition of some interests and not others has resulted in 
limits on campaign contributions, but not in limits on candidate or 
independent expenditures.  Although some recent scholarship has 
argued that the Court is moving toward an increasingly pro-regulatory 
position, there is no indication that the Court is inclined to reverse itself 
and adopt a level playing field approach.  After the passage of thirty-
three years, a number of notable Court decisions, and a second 
Congressional attempt to improve campaign finance law, the state and 
federal legislatures are still left with Court opinions that proscrib
nditure caps,228 and the primary expenditure-contribution 
dichotomy first elucidated in Buckley v. Valeo remains alive and well. 
There are two ways in which campaign funding can lead to “undue 
influence.”  The first involves contributions.  The rationale behind 
regulating contributions is the potential for a quid pro quo exchange of 
political favor for campaign monies.  Even where there is no clear 
opportunity for quid pro quo exchange, there is the potential that a 
224 The answer is not as simple as it may appear.  It has been remarked: “[T]he Justices 
[cannot] agree on what purportedly is the central issue in campaign finance law.”  See Ringhand, 
supra note 21, at 77. 
225 “Quid-pro-quo corruption is when elected politicians feel indebted to big donors and repay 
these donors with a variety of political favors.”  Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
226 The Court is not unanimous in its view that campaign funds constitute speech.  Justice 
Stevens has famously asserted that “money is . . . not speech.”  Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov’t 
PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 398 (2000) (concurring).  Justice Breyer also asserted that money is not 
speech, although he noted that money enables speech.  Id. at 400 (concurring). 
227 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49. 
228 See Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990). 
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ctorate.  
Limiting spending on campaign communication would address the 
danger of mass distortion and manipulation of voting decisions. 
B
eference to the ability of legislators to define and address 
problems.  More recently, the Court has swung back toward the earlier 
skepticism
ncing programs for Presidential elections, and 
creat
candidate who has received substantial contributions from a particular 
source may be influenced by this generosity in the course of subsequent 
political dealings.  The second way in which campaign financing can be 
said to have undue influence pertains to expenditures.  When groups 
and individuals are able to spend theoretically unlimited amounts 
(“independent expenditures”) on communication directed at the voting 
public, there is the potential for these groups to gain excessive influence 
over the electorate.  Empirical research on the effects of strategic 
campaign efforts has demonstrated the potential for exploitative tactics 
to be used to influence the decision-making processes of the ele
.     A History of Campaign Finance Reform in the United States 
The campaign finance reform movement has a tortured history.  
The beginning of the saga was marked by extreme skepticism of 
Congress’s attempt to restrict campaign funding.  The period following 
this is characterized as a move toward a more liberal approach and an 
increasing d
. 
1.     The Federal Election Campaign Act and Buckley v. Valeo 
Buckley v. Valeo229 challenged the constitutionality of the Federal 
Election Campaign Act (FECA),230 as amended in 1974.  The FECA 
Amendments limited certain political contributions and expenditures, 
imposed disclosure requirements on political committees who receive 
contributions, and on individuals and groups who make contributions, 
developed public fina
ed the Federal Election Commission as the administering agency of 
these requirements.231
The Act was challenged primarily on First Amendment grounds. 
The appellants argued that limiting the use of money for political 
purposes constituted an impermissible restriction of speech, because in 
their view “virtually all meaningful political communications in the 
229 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
230 FECA was first signed into law in 1972.  Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. 
d in sections of 2, 18, and 47 U.S.C.). 
263 (1974). 
No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified as amende
231 Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1
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tic 
incre
vidual 
contr
 marginal restriction on First Amendment rights was 
outweighed by the governmental interests offered in support of the 
modern setting involve the expenditure of money.”232  The appellees 
argued that several important governmental interests were advanced by 
the regulations, including: (1) preventing corruption or the appearance 
of corruption; (2) “equaliz[ing] the relative ability of all citizens to 
affect the outcome of elections;” and (3) “tempering the drama
ases in the costs of political campaigns so as to encourage the 
participation of political candidates lacking large sums of money.”233
The Court noted that the Act’s contribution and expenditure 
limitations “operate in an area of the most fundamental First 
Amendment activities” in that “[d]iscussion of public issues and debate 
on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of the 
system of government established by our Constitution.”234  The 
Supreme Court went on to say that the First Amendment “affords the 
broadest protection to such political expression in order ‘to assure the 
unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and 
social changes desired by the people.’”235  The Court concluded that a 
substantial interference with constitutionally protected rights of political 
speech and association may be permissible if the countervailing interest 
is sufficiently important and the government employs means closely 
drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgement of protected freedoms.236
Ultimately, the Buckley Court sustained the Act’s indi
ibution limits, disclosure provision, and public financing scheme, 
but found the expenditure limitations “constitutionally infirm.”237
In finding contribution limitations constitutional, the Court held 
that the primary purpose of the contribution limit—to avoid corruption 
and the appearance of corruption—was a constitutionally sufficient 
justification for the provision.238  With respect to the abridged freedom, 
the court called a restriction on contributions a “marginal restriction” on 
the contributor’s speech because donating funds to a candidate only 
communicates support for the candidate without communicating any 
underlying rationale for the support.239  With respect to contributions, 
FECA’s
Act.240
232 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 11. 
. 
 143. 
 that “the integrity of our system of representative democracy is 
233 Id. at 25-26
234 Id. at 14. 
235 Id. (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)). 
236 See id. at 25. 
237 Id. at
238 The Court stated
undermined” when large contributions are given to secure “political quid pro quo from current 
and potential office holders,” as shown by the examples that surfaced after the 1972 election.  Id. 
at 26-27. 
239 See id. at 20-21. 
240 The Court concluded that “the weighty interests served by restricting the size of financial 
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The Court viewed expenditures differently than contributions and 
accordingly struck down restrictions on expenditures.241  According to 
the Court, the primary effect of these expenditure limitations was to 
limit speech.242  In finding the expenditure limitations constitutionally 
infirm, the Court noted that a restriction on the amount of money a 
person or group can spend on political communication during a 
campaign “necessarily reduces the quantity of expression . . . because 
virtually every means of communicating ideas in today’s mass society 
requires the expenditure of money.”243  The Court was also concerned 
with the breadth of the restrictions because of their application to all 
individuals and groups.244
In striking down expenditure limits, the Court downplayed any 
governmental interest in leveling the playing field with respect to 
influencing election outcomes.245  With respect to the equalizing 
rationale, the Court famously said: 
It is argued . . . that the ancillary governmental interest in equalizing 
the relative ability of individuals and groups to influence the 
outcome of elections serves to justify the limitation[s on 
expenditures]. But the concept that government may restrict the 
speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the 
relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment, 
which was designed to secure the widest possible dissemination of 
information from diverse and antagonistic sources, and to assure 
unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and 
contri irst 
Amendment freedoms caused by the $1,000 contribution ceiling.”  Id. at 29. The Court also 
concluded that the $5,000 limitation on contributions by political committees enhanced the 
opportunity of association “of bona fide groups to participate in the election process, and the 
butions to political candidates are sufficient to justify the limited effect upon F
registration, contribution, and candidate conditions serve the permissible purpose of preventing 
individuals from evading the applicable contribution limitations by labeling themselves 
committees.”  Id. at 35-36.  And finally, the $25,000 limitation on total contributions during any 
calendar year was constitutional even though it did impose a restriction on “the number of 
candidates and committees with which an individual may associate himself by means of financial 
support,” since the restraint served “to prevent evasion of the $1,000 contribution limitation” and 
was thus no more than a corollary to the individual limitation.  Id. at 38. 
241 FECA as amended in 1974 limits expenditures by individuals or groups “relative to a 
clearly identified candidate” to “$1,000 per candidate per election, and by a candidate from his 
personal or family funds to various specified annual amounts depending upon the federal office 
sought, and restricts overall general election and primary campaign expenditures by candidates to 
various specified amounts, again depending upon the federal office sought.”  Id. at 1. 
242 The Court characterized limitations on expenditures as “restrict[ing] the quantity of speech 
by individuals, groups, and candidates.”  Id. at 39. 
243 Id. at 19. 
244 Id. at 19-20.  The Court asserted that placing restrictions on spending by candidates 
represented “substantial rather than merely theoretical restraints on the quantity and diversity of 
political speech” because the limitation appeared to “exclude all citizens and groups except 
candidates, political parties, and the institutional press from any significant use of the most 
effective modes of communication.”  Id.
245 The Court explicitly rejected the goal of “equalizing the relative ability of individuals and 
groups to influence the outcome of elections.”  Id. at 48-49. 
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tal abridgment of free expression 
abrid
to what degree private spending on a candidate is excessive, 
leavi
sale” was insufficient to justify campaign finance rules.  While the 
social changes desired by the people.  The First Amendment’s 
protection against governmen
cannot properly be made to depend on a person’s financial ability to 
engage in public discussion.246
Furthermore, according to the Court “there is no precedent which 
supports the position that “the First Amendment permits Congress to
ge the rights of some persons to engage in political expression in 
order to enhance the relative voice of other segments of our society.”247
The Court failed to recognize any danger in one candidate 
spending substantial sums (and substantially more than her opponent), 
instead linking any danger stemming from expenditures with dangers 
associated with contributions.248  But the Court was reassured with 
respect to this concern, noting that “the Act’s contribution limitations 
and disclosure provisions” would address any potential dangers.249
Particularly with respect to the overall campaign expenditures, the 
Court concluded that the financial resources available to a candidate 
would vary depending on “the size and intensity of the candidate’s 
support.”250  Importantly, the Court decided that “there is nothing 
invidious, improper, or unhealthy in permitting such funds to be spent to 
carry the candidate’s message to the electorate.”251  According to the 
Court, the First Amendment precludes the government from dictating 
when and 
ng this determination in the hands of the citizens of the United 
States.252
After Buckley, the Court consistently adhered to two basic 
principles in its campaign finance cases.  The first was that the only 
constitutionally acceptable rationale for campaign finance regulation 
was to combat the corruption or the appearance of corruption. 
Restricting political money to level the playing field between rich and 
poor candidates or to hold down the cost of running for office, on the 
other hand, were each repeatedly rejected as unworthy reasons to 
encroach upon the First Amendment.  The second was that the only kind 
of acceptable corruption was the quid pro quo exchange of a specific 
campaign contribution for a cooperative vote on legislation.  A more 
general view of corruption signaling that the political system was “for 
246 See id.
247 Id. at 49. 
248 Id. at 47, 55. 
249 Id. at 55. 
250 Id. at 56. 
251 Id.
252 Specifically, the Court indicated that it fell outside the government’s “power to determine 
that spending to promote one’s political views is wasteful, excessive, or unwise.”  Id. at 57.  
Instead, this is the responsibility of the citizenry as a whole.  Id.
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g political voice was maintained in the Court’s 
subsequent decisions.253
2.     Post-Buckley, Pre-BCRA Cases 
ocacy may persuade the electorate 
is ha
roved capping expenditures (albeit in a very 
circu
its interpretation of Buckley,259 opting instead for a more flexible 
definition of “corruption” morphed slightly in later cases, the firm 
position against equalizin
Between the time that the court handed down its opinion in 
Buckley and the passage of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act 
(BCRA), there were a number of Supreme Court campaign finance 
cases.  Three merit mentioning here.  First, in Boston v. Bellotti,254 the 
Court found unconstitutional a Massachusetts law limiting corporations’ 
participation in ballot measure campaigns.  In determining that the law 
improperly abridged the First Amendment right to free speech, the 
Court claimed that “the fact that adv
rdly a reason to suppress it.”255
This permissive perspective on the proper role of corporate 
interests in elections was turned on its head in Austin v. Michigan 
Chamber of Commerce, decided twelve years after Bellotti.256  Plaintiffs 
in Austin were challenging a Michigan law that prohibited non-media 
corporations from using general treasury funds for independent 
expenditures in state election campaigns.  The Court used a novel type 
of corruption rationale to uphold the law, holding that “Michigan’s 
regulation aims at a different type of corruption in the political arena: 
the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth 
that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have 
little or no correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s 
political ideas.”257 Austin is notable as the only case the Court has ever 
decided that seemed to accept the equalization rationale (in limited 
circumstances) and app
mscribed context). 
In 2000, ten years after Austin was decided, the Court upheld 
Missouri’s campaign contribution limits for state elections in Nixon v. 
Shrink Missouri Government PAC.258  In Shrink Missouri, the Court 
rejected the Eighth Circuit’s application of “strict scrutiny” based upon 
253 See supra Part III.A. 
254 First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990). 
255 Id. at 790. 
256 Austin v. Mich
257 Id. at 659-60. 
258 528 U.S. 377 (2000). 
259 Id. at 384 (“Finding that Buckley had ‘articulated and applied a strict scrutiny standard of 
review,’ the Court of Appeals held that Missouri was bound to demonstrate ‘that it has a 
compelling interest and that the contribution limits at issue are narrowly drawn to serve that 
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approach.260  Additionally, the Court refused to be tethered to a set 
basement for contribution limits, stating: 
In Buckley, we specifically rejected the contention that $1,000, or 
any other amount, was a constitutional minimum below which 
legislatures could not regulate. As indicated above, we referred 
instead to the outer limits of contribution regulation by asking 
whether there was any showing that the limits were so low as to 
impede the ability of candidates to “amass[] the resources necessary 
for effective advocacy.”261
The Shrink Missouri Court’s rejection of “strict scrutiny” 
demonstrated greater willingness to make room for rationales other than 
corruption and appearance of corruption, while the Court’s refusal to 
put a floor on contribution limits suggested that the Court was less 
concerned about the silencing potential of campaign regulations than it 
had been when it decided Buckley.
The combination of the new version of corruption advanced by the 
Court in Austin, along with the more flexible approach taken in Shrink 
Missouri, would seem to leave room for a campaign regulation structure 
designed to protect the government’s interest in a fair and equal election 
process—namely, one that caps expenditures.  Although the Court 
seemed poised to acknowledge the legitimacy of protecting the election 
process against the influence of those with substantial financial means, 
it stopped short of taking the steps it needs to prevent such influences, 
as we see in the major case to follow campaign finance reforms of 2002, 
McConnell v. FEC. 
3.     BCRA and McConnell v. FEC
The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA),262
otherwise known as the McCain-Feingold Act, was Congress’s attempt 
to amend the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA) and other 
portions of the United States Code “to purge national politics of what 
[is] conceived to be the pernicious influence of ‘big money’ campaign 
interest.’” (quoting Shrink Missouri Gov’t PAC v. Adams, 161 F.3d 519, 521 (1998))). 
260 The Court held that “[t]he quantum of empirical evidence needed to satisfy heightened 
judicial scrutiny of legislative judgments will vary up or down with the novelty and plausibility of 
the justification raised.”  Id. at 391.  The majority in Buckley determined that the campaign 
finance context is “a case where constitutionally protected interests lie on both sides of the legal 
equation.  For that reason there is no place for a strong presumption against constitutionality, of 
the sort often thought to accompany the words ‘strict scrutiny.’”  Id. at 400 (Breyer, J., 
concurring). 
261 Id. at 397 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21 (1976)).  The Court went on to say: 
“We asked, in other words, whether the contribution limitation was so radical in effect as to 
render political association ineffective, drive the sound of a candidate’s voice below the level of 
notice, and render contributions pointless.”  Id.
262 Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002) (codified as amended in sections of 2 U.S.C.). 
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contributions.”263  Specifically, Congress sought to address “the 
increased importance of ‘soft money,’ the proliferation of ‘issue ads,’ 
and the disturbing findings of a Senate investigation into campaign 
practices related to the 1996 federal elections.”264  Congress found that 
political parties were circumventing FECA in several ways, 
necessitating reform.265  Title I of the BCRA “regulates the use of soft 
money266 by political parties, officeholders, and candidates,”267 while 
263 United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 572 (1957).  Relevant statutes enacted by the BCRA 
include: 2 U.S.C. §§ 441(i), 441(k), and 441(a) (repealed), and 2 U.S.C. § 438 (a).  The BCRA 
formed the basis for McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).  FECA regulated donations “made 
by any person for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office,” but left unregulated 
donations made “solely for the purpose of influencing state or local elections.”  Id. at 122.  As a 
result, prior to the enactment of the BCRA, corporations, unions, and even wealthy individuals 
“who had already made the maximum permissible contributions to federal candidates” could 
contribute “nonfederal money,” known as “soft money,” to political parties intended to influence 
state or local elections.  Id. at 123.  Such soft money contributions were often “designed to gain 
access to federal candidates” and were in many cases “solicited by the candidates themselves.”  
Id. at 125.  “The solicitation, transfer, and use of soft money thus enabled parties and candidates 
to circumvent FECA’s limitations on the source and amount of contributions in connection with 
federal elections.”  Id. at 126. 
264 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 122. 
265 With regard to soft money, FECA’s existing disclosure requirements prior to the BCRA 
only pertained to “hard money,” or money contributed for the “purpose of influencing any 
election for Federal office.”  Id. at 123 (referring to 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(A)(i)) (emphasis omitted).  
This meant that “soft money” contributions for other election activities, such as state and local 
elections and mixed-purpose activities, went unregulated.  Mixed-purpose activities referred to 
generic party advertising, such as “get-out-the-vote” drives and other informal activities that did 
not explicitly back a particular candidate and legislative advocacy advertisements that did not 
explicitly endorse the defeat or victory of a particular candidate.  Essentially, as long as the ad did 
not use the magic words “Vote Against ______,” the ad or activity was beyond the reach of 
FECA regulation.  These sorts of communications were referred to as “coordinated expenditures,” 
as opposed to “independent expenditures,” that did not refer to “communications that in express 
terms advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate for federal office.”  Buckley, 
424 U.S. at 42-44.  This is why Congress enacted Title I of the BCRA, which primarily restricts 
or regulates the use of soft money by political parties, officeholders, and candidates.  Title I of the 
BCRA “takes national parties out of the soft-money business.”  McConnell, 540 U.S. at 133. 
266 The term “soft money” may be thought of generally as political donations made in such a 
way as to avoid federal regulations or limits, and specifically, those donations going to a party 
organization rather than to a particular candidate or campaign. 
267 Title I was Congress’s attempt to “plug the soft-money loophole” of political contribution 
and expenditures.  McConnell, 540 U.S. at 133. “The cornerstone of Title I is new FECA § 
323(a), which prohibits national party committees and their agents from soliciting, receiving, 
directing, or spending any soft money.”  Id.  The remaining provisions of Title I reinforce the 
restrictions of section 323(a), with section 323(b)’s preventing “the wholesale shift of soft-money 
influence from national and state party committees by prohibiting state and local party 
committees from using such funds for activities that affect federal elections,” section 323(d)’s 
prohibiting “political parties from soliciting and donating funds to tax-exempt organizations that 
engage in electioneering activities,” section 323(e)’s restricting “federal candidates and 
officeholders from receiving, spending, or soliciting soft money in connection with federal 
elections and limit[ing] their ability to do so in connection with state and local elections,” and 
section 323(f)’s preventing the “circumvention of the restrictions on national, state, and local 
party committees by prohibiting state and local candidates from raising and spending soft money 
to fund advertisements and other public communications that promote or attack federal 
candidates.”  Id. at 133-34. 
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Title II “primarily prohibits corporations and labor unions from using 
general treasury funds for communications that are intended to, or have 
the effect of, influencing the outcome of federal elections.”268  It also 
doubled the contribution limit of hard money, from $1,000 to $2,000 
per election cycle, with a built-in increase for inflation.269
In McConnell v. Federal Election Commission,270 which 
challenged the constitutionality of the BCRA, the Court found 
governmental interest in preventing “both the actual corruption 
threatened by large financial contributions and the eroding of public 
confidence in the electoral process through the appearance of 
corruption.”271  In upholding almost all of the BCRA, the Court applied 
the same rationale that guided the Buckley decision.272  The Court 
maintained its focus on the link between campaign funding and speech, 
but found that the restrictions in section 323 of the BRCA had “only a 
marginal impact on the ability of contributors, candidates, officeholders, 
and parties to engage in effective political speech.”273  The Court also 
held that section 323 shows “due regard for the reality that solicitation 
is characteristically intertwined with informative and perhaps persuasive 
speech seeking support for particular causes or for particular views.”274
Moreover, the Court deemed the BCRA critical to serving 
legitimate and vital governmental interests.275  The objective of 323(b) 
  Section 323(a) provides that “national committee[s] of a political party . . . may not solicit, 
receive, or direct to another person a contribution, donation, or transfer of funds or any other 
thing of value, or spend any funds, that are not subject to the limitations, prohibitions, and 
reporting requirements of this Act.”  Id. at 142 (alteration in original).  The main goal is to effect 
a “return to the scheme that was approved in Buckley” and to stop donors who direct money to the 
political committees from contributing “large amounts of soft money for use in activities 
designed to influence federal elections.”  Id.  “The Government defends section 323(a)’s ban on 
national parties involvement with soft money as necessary to prevent the actual and apparent 
corruption of federal candidates and officeholders,” and the Court states that this prevention 
“constitutes a sufficiently important interest to justify political contribution limits.”  Id. at 143.  
This interest was deemed “sufficient to justify not only contribution limits themselves, but laws 
preventing the circumvention of such limits.”  Id. at 144. 
268 Id. at 132.  In McConnell, the Court held that this was the governmental interest.  Id.
269 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 307, 116 Stat. 81, 102 
(codified at 2 U.S.C. §441a(a) (2006)). 
270 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
271 Id. at 136 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
272 The question for the Court thus became whether “large soft money contributions to 
national party committees have a corrupting influence or give rise to the appearance of 
corruption,” to which the Court answered yes.  Id. at 145. 
273 Id.  Specifically, the Court held that section 323 “does little more than regulate the ability 
of wealthy individuals, corporations, and unions to contribute large sums of money to influence 
federal elections, federal candidates, and federal officeholders.”  Id. at 138. 
274 Id. at 139-40 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The restriction of this section of the 
BCRA does not “chill such solicitations” but rather “tends to increase the dissemination of 
information by forcing parties, candidates, and officeholders to solicit from a wider array of 
potential donors.”  Id. at 140. 
275 The Court based its conclusion that the BCRA served an important loop hole-closing 
function in large part on Congressional findings.  Id. at 122-25.  In 2000, for instance, a 
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is to prevent unregulated contributions to state and local party
committees with the goal of financing federal election activities,276
“foreclos[ing on a] wholesale evasion of section 323(a)’s anticorruption 
measures by sharply curbing state committees’ ability to use large soft-
money contributions to influence federal elections.”277  The Court found 
the prevention of corruption to be a sufficiently important governmental 
interest to outweigh the constitutional concerns,278 and determined that 
the provision was not overbroad.279
Several provisions of the BCRA are particularly germane to the 
current discussion.  Section 323(e) regulates the raising and soliciting of 
soft money by federal candidates and officeholders, prohibiting 
“soliciting, receiving, directing, transferring, or spending any soft 
money in connection with federal elections” and “limit[ing] the ability 
of federal candidates and officeholders to solicit, receive, direct, 
transfer, or spend soft money in connection with state and local 
elections,” in most instances.280  Section 323(f) generally prohibits 
Congressional committee found that “the national parties diverted $280 million—more than half 
of their soft money—to state parties.”  Id. at 124.  In 1990, the FEC clarified the phrase “on a 
reasonable basis” with regard to a party’s ability to allocate administrative expenses between 
accounts containing federal and non-federal funds by promulgating fixed allocation rates.  Id.
The clarification obligated the Republican and Democratic National Committees to pay for at 
least sixty percent of mixed-purpose activities with funding from federal accounts, which were 
subject to FECA.  Id.  The regulations, however, essentially allowed state candidates to expend “a 
substantially greater proportion of soft money than national parties to fund mixed-purpose 
activities affecting both federal and state elections.”  Id.  In response, the BCRA essentially 
prohibits the shifting of federal money to state party activity that affects federal elections, 
including the funding of mixed-purpose activities.  Id. at 161-62; 2 U.S.C. § 441(i)(b) (2006). 
276 See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 161-62. 
277 Id. at 161.  The governmental interest underlying new FECA section 323(b) is similar to 
the overriding interest of preventing actual corruption and the appearance of corruption.  See id. at 
167.  Congress concluded: 
[T]he corrupting influence of soft money does not insinuate itself into the political 
process solely though national party committees.  Rather, state committees function as 
an alternative avenue for precisely the same corrupting forces.  Indeed, both candidates 
and parties were asking donors who have reached the limit on their direct contributions 
to donate to state committees. 
Id. at 164 (footnotes omitted). 
278 Id. at 165-66. 
279 In tackling the associational burden argument the Court found that the anti-circumvention 
goal outweighs any associational burden, and stated that “state and local parties can avoid these 
associational burdens altogether by . . . electing to pay for federal election activities entirely with 
hard money.”  Id. at 171.  Finally, the Court found the evidence regarding the impact of the 
BCRA on campaign revenues “speculative and not based on any analysis,” but held open the 
possibility for as-applied challenges in which the plaintiff would have to prove that the amount of 
funds available is “so radical in effect as to drive the sound of the recipient’s voice below the 
level of notice.”  Id. at 173 (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 397 
(2000)). 
280 See id. at 181.  The Court said that “[b]y severing the most direct link between the soft 
money donor and the federal candidate, section 323(e)’s ban on donations of soft money is 
closely drawn to prevent the corruption or the appearance of corruption of federal candidates.”  
Id. at 182. 
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candidates for state or local office, or state or local officeholders, from
spending soft money to fund “public communications,” defined as 
communication that “refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal 
office . . . and that promotes or supports a candidate for that office, or 
attacks or opposes a candidate for that office.”281 Free from this 
restriction are “communications made in connection with an election for 
state or local office which refer only to the state or local candidate or 
officeholder making the expenditure or to any other candidate for the 
same state or local office.”282  Importantly, in upholding these 
provisions, the Court was not substantively altering the course it set in 
Buckley.  By regulating only public communications, the BCRA 
targeted those soft-money donations (not expenditures) having the 
greatest potential to corrupt or give rise to the appearance of corruption 
of federal officeholders.283
Further evidence that the Court maintained its Buckley no-limits-
on-expenditures position is that it struck down section 213 of the BCRA 
that required the candidate to choose between two spending options 
following the nomination of a candidate for a federal office.284  This 
section effectively limited parties to independent expenditures or 
coordinated expenditures with respect to a given candidate, but only for 
those campaign ads that used a few magic words.285  Under this 
provision, the parties would remain free to make independent 
expenditures for the vast majority of campaign ads that avoided the use 
of the magic words.  However, the Court struck this provision down as 
unconstitutional, holding that while this may be a small category of 
281 Id. at 184. 
282 Id.
283 Id.  In summary, the Court in McConnell held that section 323(a) does not violate the First 
Amendment, section 323(b) is closely drawn to match the important governmental interest, 
section 323(d) is a valid anti-circumvention measure, section 323(e) does not violate the First 
Amendment, and section 323(f) is a valid anti-circumvention provision.  Id. at 93-101.  The Court 
also upheld the disclosure requirements and use of the new term “electioneering communication” 
in section 201, but the Court did not foreclose the possibility of future challenges to particular 
applications of the disclosure requirement.  Sections 202, 203, 204, and 214 were also held 
constitutional, while section 213 was found unconstitutional.  Finally, sections 311 and 504 were 
found constitutional and section 318 was held to be in violation of the First Amendment.  Id. at 
102-10. 
284 Id. at 215. 
285 Id. at 215-16.  An “independent expenditure” is an expenditure by a person “expressly 
advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate” and which is “not made in 
concert or cooperation with or at the request or suggestion of such candidate, the candidate’s 
authorized political committee, or their agents, or a political party committee or its agents.”  2 
U.S.C. § 431(17) (2006).  The definition of a “coordinated expenditure” is less straightforward, in 
part because the very definition has been the subject of litigation.  See Fed. Election Comm’n v. 
Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431 (2001) (upholding restrictions on 
coordinated expenditures by parties).  The BCRA expanded the definition of “coordinated 
expenditures.”  Current FEC regulations defining “coordinated communications” contain a 
content prong, which requires that the communication be related to a federal election.  11 C.F.R. 
§ 109.21(c) (2009). 
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burdened speech, “it plainly is entitled to First Amendment Protection.” 
286  This aspect of McConnell is notable, not only because it is one of 
few provisions of the BCRA the Court found unconstitutional, but also 
because it indicates the Court’s continuing resistance to placing 
limitations on expenditures. 
Some viewed McConnell as a surprising outcome, given the 
Court’s earlier attitude of general skepticism toward campaign funding 
restrictions.287  However, it is important to understand that McConnell
was not a sea change from the path the Court was on prior to that 
decision.288  In spite of earlier cases suggesting that the Court may be 
turning over a new leaf, the McConnell opinion reaffirmed the 
fundamental tenets of its Buckley opinion.289  First, McConnell 
reiterated the notion that any restriction on campaign funding implicates 
the First Amendment.  As a result, attempts to restrict funding of 
campaigns and campaign activity must be narrowly tailored to serve an 
important governmental interest.  The compelling interest remained 
avoiding corruption or the appearance of corruption, and while the 
Court was willing to permit loophole-closing provisions that went to the 
286 See McConnell, 540 U.S at 217.  Under this provision, a “political party’s exercise of its 
constitutionally protected right to engage in core First Amendment Expression” results in a “loss 
of a valuable statutory benefit that has been available to parties for many years.”  Id.  To “survive 
constitutional scrutiny, a provision that has such consequences must be supported by a 
meaningful governmental interest.”  Id.  The governmental interest here is “requiring political 
parties to avoid the use of magic words,” and the Court said this is not enough to support the 
constitutional burden.  Id.  The Court further stated that “any claim that a restriction on 
independent express advocacy serves a strong Government interest is belied by the overwhelming 
evidence that the line between express advocacy and other types of election-influencing 
expression is, for Congress’s purposes, functionally meaningless.”  Id.
  The Government argues that this provision is “not an outright ban on independent 
expenditures, but rather offers parties a voluntary choice between a constitutional right and a 
statutory benefit,” but the Court rejected that argument saying that a “local party committee 
would be able to tie the hands of a state committee or other local committees in the same State” 
by being the first mover, thus taking the choice away.  Id. at 218. 
287 See, e.g., Lillian BeVier, Campaign Finance Regulation: Less, Please, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
1115, 1115-16 (2002); Richard L. Hasen, The Newer Incoherence: Competition, Social Science, 
and Balancing in Campaign Finance Law After Randall v. Sorrell, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 849, 850-52
(2007).  Although some view McConnell as a substantial departure from Buckley, those who 
make this argument do so primarily based upon the tone of “deference” to Congress (or 
conversely lack of “skepticism” in Congressional attempts to regulate). 
288 See Richard L. Hasen, Buckley Is Dead, Long Live Buckley: The New Campaign Finance 
Incoherence of McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 31, 32 (2004);
see also Hasen, supra note 287, at 859. 
289 One commentator has remarked: 
The Court in McConnell, as part of four recent Supreme Court cases making up “the 
New Deference Quartet,” seemed poised to embrace a political equality rationale for 
campaign financing.   In particular, the Court seemed to tacitly endorse the 
“participatory self-government” objective for campaign finance reform proposed by 
Justice Breyer in a concurring opinion in one of the earlier New Deference cases.  It 
nonetheless “continued to entertain the fiction that it [was] adhering to the 
anticorruption rationale of Buckley v. Valeo . . . . 
Hasen, supra note 287, at 850-51 (citations omitted). 
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heart of soft-money contributions, the Court viewed this as a mere fix to 
the FEC, not a change to the rationale and scope of campaign 
limitations.  Importantly, the Court continued to reject the notion that 
campaign regulation could have as a legitimate purpose to equalize 
political voice. 290
4.     Randall v. Sorrell and Davis v. FEC 
Randall v. Sorrell291 was the first case since Buckley to seriously 
test the Court’s treatment of general campaign expenditure limits.  This 
case required the Supreme Court to consider the constitutionality of 
contribution and expenditure limits imposed by Vermont’s “Act 64.”  
The Vermont legislature’s attempt to rein in campaign spending resulted 
from the conviction that unlimited campaign spending had distorted the 
electoral process and seriously compromised the fairness of elections.292
290 Gerard J. Clark & Steven B. Lichtman, The Finger in the Dike: Campaign Finance 
Regulation After McConnell, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 629, 642 (2006).  The post-Buckley era was 
marked by a consistent adherence to two fundamental principles: 
First, the only constitutionally acceptable rationale for campaign finance regulation 
was to combat the corruption or the appearance of corruption.  Restricting political 
money to level the playing field between rich and poor candidates and to holding down 
the cost of running for office were repeatedly rejected as unworthy reasons to encroach 
upon the First Amendment.  Second, prevention of only quid pro quo corruption—the 
exchange of a campaign contribution for a cooperative vote on legislation—justified 
burdening free speech.  A more general view of corruption signaling that the political 
system was generally “for sale” was insufficient to justify campaign finance rules. The 
McConnell court abandoned neither of these principles. 
Id. 
291 548 U.S. 230 (2006). 
292 See Brief of Respondents, Cross-Petitioners Vermont Public Interest Research Group et al. 
at 7-9, Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006) (Nos. 04-1528, 04-1530, 04-1697).  Findings of 
the Vermont General Assembly that supported the imposition of limits on expenditures included 
the following: 
(1) Election campaigns for statewide and state legislative offices are becoming too 
expensive.  As a result many Vermonters are financially unable to seek election to 
public office and candidates for statewide offices are spending inordinate amounts of 
time raising campaign funds. . . . 
(4) Robust debate of issues, candidate interaction with the electorate, and public 
involvement and confidence in the electoral process have decreased as campaign 
expenditures have increased. 
(5) Increasing campaign expenditures require candidates to seek and rely on a smaller 
number of larger contributors, often outside the state, rather than a large number of 
small contributors. . . . 
(9) Large contributions and large expenditures by persons or committees, other than 
the candidate and particularly from out-of-state political committees or corporations, 
reduce public confidence in the electoral process and increase the appearance that 
candidates and elected officials will not act in the best interests of Vermont citizens. 
(10) Citizen interest, participation and confidence in the electoral process is [sic] 
lessened by excessively long and expensive campaigns. . . . 
(12) Public financing of campaigns, coupled with generally applicable contribution and 
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The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the 
constitutionality of spending limits,293 and Justice Souter (whose dissent 
Justice Ginsburg joined) thought it appropriate to defer to the Vermont 
State Legislature in determining the appropriateness of spending 
limits.294  However, a majority of the Roberts Court killed spending 
limits categorically.295  One observer noted that “[f]or the foreseeable 
future, constitutional challenges to the spending limit holding of 
Buckley now appear foreclosed.296
The Court also rejected the contribution limitations set out in Act 
64 as unconstitutionally restrictive.297  Vermont’s low contribution 
limits, according to Breyer’s plurality opinion, were not sufficiently 
carefully tailored to pass muster.  The opinion listed five factors that 
made the limitations problematic: (1) the contribution limits appeared to 
restrict funds available to challengers to run competitive elections; (2) 
political parties were subject to the same contribution limitations;298 (3) 
the law appeared to count a volunteer’s expenses against the volunteer’s 
contribution limit, placing a particular burden on First Amendment 
freedoms; (4) the limits were not designed to adjust to account for 
inflation; and (5) nothing in the record foreclosed on the possibility that 
less restrictive limits would suffice.299
The Randall opinion was the first decided by the Roberts Court, 
and it is suggestive of the general future direction of campaign finance 
expenditure limitations, will level the financial playing field among candidates and 
provide resources to independent candidates, both of which will increase the debate of 
issues and ideas. 
(13) In Vermont, campaign expenditures by persons who are not candidates have been 
increasing and public confidence is eroded when substantial amounts of soft money are 
expended, particularly during the final days of a campaign. 
Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d 91, 101-02 (2d Cir. 2004), rev’d sub nom. Randall v. Sorrell, 548 
U.S. 230 (2006). 
293 See Landell, 382 F.3d at 97, 148-49. 
294 Justice Souter wrote: 
[T]he Buckley Court did not categorically foreclose the possibility that some spending 
limit might comport with the First Amendment.  Instead, Buckley held that the 
constitutionality of an expenditure limitation turns on whether the governmental 
interests advanced in its support satisfy the applicable exacting scrutiny . . . .  
Vermont’s argument therefore does not ask us to overrule Buckley; it asks us to apply 
Buckley’s framework to determine whether its evidence here on a need to slow the 
fundraising treadmill suffices to support the enacted limitations. 
Randall, 548 U.S. at 281-83 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
295 Id. at 244-46 (plurality opinion); id. at 265 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).  Two 
more Justices, Kennedy and Alito, seemingly inclined the same way.  Id. at 263 (Alito, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at 264 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the 
judgment). 
296 Hasen, supra note 287, at 861-62; see Randall, 548 U.S. at 246 (plurality opinion); id. at 
264 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). 
297 Randall, 548 U.S. at 253-62; see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 (1976). 
298 This parallel limitation was deemed to infringe on the right of association.  Randall, 548 
U.S. at 256. 
299 See id. at 253-62. 
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jurisprudence.  The holding accomplished two things.  First, it dashed 
the hopes of all who saw merit in the potential leveling or equalizing 
effect of campaign finance law through the imposition of limits on 
campaign expenditures.  Second, it raised the bar (again) with respect to 
campaign contribution limits, defining “narrowly tailored” in a 
particularly restrictive manner. 
Davis v. FEC,300 decided in 2008, reaffirmed the Court’s strong 
opposition to limits on expenditures and to advancing an equalizing 
rationale through campaign restrictions.  In Davis, the Court evaluated 
the “Millionaire’s Amendment” provision of the BCRA, which 
loosened restrictions on the size of donations candidates may receive 
from individuals and the amount parties can spend on coordinated 
campaign expenditures when a candidate’s opponent spends above a 
certain amount of his own money.  Importantly, the effect of the 
Millionaire’s Amendment was to equalize resources available to 
opposing candidates by making it easier for a given candidate to raise 
money when her opponent had access to substantial personal wealth.301
The equalizing goal and effect of this amendment was rejected by the 
Court, because, according to the holding in Davis, the FEC’s interest in 
“level[ing] electoral opportunities for candidates of different personal 
wealth”302 is ultimately outweighed by the “unprecedented penalty on 
any candidate who robustly exercises [his] First Amendment right.”303
This reiteration of the Court’s concern over the unconstitutionality of 
hampering political speech was accompanied by another familiar theme 
from Buckley, namely the focus on “eliminating corruption or the 
perception of corruption,” which the Court determined the Millionaire’s 
Amendment failed to effect.304
C.     Summarizing Thirty-Five Years of Legislation and Jurisprudence 
1.     Fundamental Tenets of the Court’s Jurisprudence 
It is no easy task to look back over thirty-five years of lawmaking 
and Supreme Court decisions to distill a few simple lessons from the 
crazy quilt of statutory provisions and opinions.  We are left with a 
patchwork of laws that regulate (and leave unregulated) campaign 
funding and spending.  However, there are several threads that run 
300 128 S. Ct. 2759 (2008). 
301  See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 319, 116 Stat. 81, 
109 (codified at 2 U.S.C. §441a-1 (2006)). 
302 See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2773. 
303 Id. at 2771. 
304 Id. at 2773. 
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throughout the Court’s opinions.  With respect to these basic principles, 
the current Court demonstrates no proclivity to change. 
First, money is speech.  The Court views funding of campaign 
activity as protected under the First Amendment.  The protection of 
speech (in the form of support for candidates or as direct persuasions on 
the part of candidates, political parties, or third parties) and the 
protection of freedom of association (most often raised when political 
parties are subject to regulation) are guarded jealously, as is appropriate.  
However, equating money with speech is not uncontroversial.  It has 
been argued that while money facilitates speech, money facilitates many 
things, and to equate campaign funds with pure speech is to conflate the 
means with the end.305  Nevertheless, the Court starts with this premise, 
and the majority of the justices demonstrate no inclination to even re-
open the issue for discussion. 
Second, the only government interest sufficiently important to 
merit any impingement on the right of this type of “speech” is 
“corruption or the appearance of corruption.”  The Court has expanded 
its definition of corruption so as to extend it beyond pure quid pro quo 
political favor type exchange.306  However, this expanded definition 
never grew sufficiently broad to permit the type of regulations that 
would prevent massive accumulation and spending of funds to bombard 
the electorate in every conceivable medium and with every type of 
tactic.  In other words, “corruption” has never been interpreted by the 
Court to mean (or even to approach meaning) distortion or exploitation 
of the electorate through the expenditure of vast sums of money.307
A third and related point is that the Court has never overturned the 
portion of its Buckley holding that explicitly rejected the level-playing-
field rationale for campaign regulation.  Although the Court seemed to 
accept the notion that the expenditure of large sums of aggregated 
wealth by corporate interest parties was a type of “corruption” that 
merited placing limitations on First Amendment freedoms, the Court 
never explicitly approved of an equalizing rationale.  As recently as 
2008, the Court considered the leveling rationale in deciding the 
constitutionality of the Millionaire’s provision of the BCRA, and 
squarely rejected it.308
305 See supra notes 18-21, 27-33 and accompanying text. 
306 Recall that in Austin, the Court approved of Michigan’s attempt to quash a “different type 
of corruption.”  See Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990).  In Shrink 
Missouri, the Court held that “corruption” was not limited to quid pro quo arrangements, but 
rather should encompass “the broader threat from politicians too compliant with the wishes of 
large contributors.”  See Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 389 (2000). 
307 Precisely how this manipulation occurs is the subject of later discussion in this Article.  See
infra Part IV. 
308 See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2773-74. 
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Finally, the Court has maintained its position that spending limits 
are unconstitutional.  Seemingly tied to the equalization rationale,309 the 
rejection of spending limits is a hallmark of Supreme Court campaign 
finance jurisprudence.  The single exception to the rule came in the 
Austin case, where the spending limits were only applicable to general 
corporate treasury funds.  With the exception of this limited instance, 
the Court has decided that not only is the equalization interest 
insufficient to allow Congress to restrict “speech,” but, in fact, there is 
nothing problematic in the unlimited spending of funds for campaigning 
purposes.310  As long as a majority of the justices on the Court believe 
that there is nothing improper about a candidate, party, or independent 
entity, individually or in the aggregate, allocating vast sums to 
candidate-promotion efforts, no legislative body will be able to 
convince the Court to compromise the associated ostensible 
constitutional freedom.311
2.     The Contribution-Expenditure Distinction 
Even if a majority of the justices on the Court were to agree that 
equalizing candidate resources was an important governmental interest, 
observers might question the necessity of spending limits given the 
existence of contribution limits.  Following the enactment of the BCRA, 
which closed the loophole on soft-money contributions, some observers 
have argued that contributions regulations have been expanded to the 
point that any potential for wealthy parties to skew election outcomes 
has vanished.312  Strictly speaking, the prospect that well-funded entities 
309 Contribution limitations may have the effect of leveling the political playing field to a 
certain extent, but only indirectly.  Limits on independent expenditures would have a somewhat 
equalizing effect, but limiting the spending of the parties and the political candidates themselves 
would be the most direct way of assuring equality of resources.  After the demise of Congress’s 
independent expenditures in Buckley, federal legislators have not attempted to limit candidate and 
party spending, and as we have seen, Vermont’s attempt to cap spending was overturned in 
Randall. 
310 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 56-57 (1976). 
311 The Court is not the only reason why spending has not been curbed.  Thomas E. Mann, a 
senior fellow at the Brookings Institute, has noted that: 
McCain-Feingold was a very limited legislative initiative designed to restore the 
effectiveness and credibility of longstanding contribution limits and restrictions on the 
use of corporate and union treasury funds in federal elections.  Its two major pillars—a 
ban on party soft money and the regulation of electioneering communications—were 
agnostic about the total amount of money raised and spent in federal elections even 
while the rhetoric of some of the bill’s supporters in Congress and outside reformers 
made clear they longed for a reduction in the money chase. 
Thomas E. Mann, A Collapse of the Campaign Finance Regime?, 6 FORUM 1, 2 (2008). 
312 See, e.g., Yoav Dotan, Campaign Finance Reform and the Social Inequality Paradox, 37 
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 955 (2004) (arguing that the Court has been expanding permissible 
contribution regulation to the point where it almost achieves an equalizing function). 
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can influence voters via contributions has dramatically decreased.  It 
would be a mistake, however, to suppose that contribution limits alone 
serve to equalize the relative voices of candidates.  This makes too 
much of the distinction between contributions and expenditures.313
The fact that the Court has allowed restriction of contributions but 
not of expenditures has created an artificial line between the two.314
Most of the dangers the Court sought to address by permitting 
contribution limits are present when expenditures are unregulated.  As 
one observer noted, “[w]hen I contribute money to a candidate, I engage 
in an act of political association that is just as important as my decision 
to spend money on the candidate’s behalf independently.  It is simply 
wrong to treat the two as fundamentally different acts.”315
Without spending limits, there is nothing to prevent individuals 
and groups from spending large amounts of money to promote a 
particular candidate.316  Although the corruptive potential of the favor 
may be less obvious, the practical difference between funds spent by an 
independent individual and those spent by a candidate may be 
negligible.317  Furthermore, leaving spending unregulated allows 
313 As Chief Justice Burger pointed out in Buckley: 
The Court’s attempt to distinguish the communication inherent in political 
contributions from the speech aspects of political expenditures simply “will not wash.”  
We do little but engage in word games unless we recognize that people—candidates 
and contributors—spend money on political activity because they wish to communicate 
ideas, and their constitutional interest in doing so is precisely the same whether they or 
someone else utters the words. 
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 244 (Burger, C. J., concurring and dissenting). 
314 See Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 386-88 (2000).  The Court has 
maintained that an important distinction exists between contributions and expenditures based 
upon the constitutionality of regulating these forms of financing, not the effect of limiting them.  
For example, in Shrink Missouri, the Court asserted that “expenditure restrictions [are] direct 
restraints on speech.”  Id. at 386.  But in Buckley, the Court held that the “prevention of 
corruption and the appearance of corruption,” were “constitutionally sufficient justification[s]” 
for restricting contributions.  Id. at 388 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25-26). 
315 See Neuborne, supra note 30, at 116. 
316 Justice White noted the disjunction in the majority’s reasoning in his dissent in FEC v. 
National Conservative PAC: 
As in Buckley, I am convinced that it is pointless to limit the amount that can be 
contributed to a candidate or spent with his approval without also limiting the amounts 
that can be spent on his behalf. . . .  It is nonsensical to allow the purposes of this 
limitation to be entirely defeated by allowing the sort of “independent” expenditures at 
issue here, and the First Amendment does not require us to do so. 
FEC v. Nat’l Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. 480, 511-12 (1985) (White, J., dissenting). 
317 Legislators have also argued that limiting contributions does not limit spending: 
Admittedly, expenditures made directly by an individual to urge support of a candidate 
pose First Amendment issues more vividly than do financial contributions to a 
campaign fund.  Nevertheless, to prohibit a $60,000 direct contribution to be used for a 
TV spot commercial but then to permit the would-be contributor to purchase the time 
himself, and place a commercial endorsing the candidate, would exalt constitutional 
form over substance.  Your Committee does not believe the First Amendment requires 
such a wooden construction. 
S. REP. NO. 93-689, at 18-19 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5587, 5604-05 (cited in 
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candidates to spend as much money as they can amass on media blitzes, 
personal appearances, and other various propaganda efforts.  In theory, 
the amount of money that a candidate can spend in an effort to get him- 
or herself elected is limitless. 
D.     Voices of Opposition from Within the Court 
Although the Court’s holdings have been consistent in their 
rejection of the leveling rationale for campaign finance restrictions and 
have almost uniformly struck down spending caps, a notable group of 
individuals has been voicing opposition to striking down spending 
limits.  The most prominent, and for obvious reasons important, 
members of this group are Supreme Court justices. 
1.     Justice White 
Justice White was the first Supreme Court Justice to voice 
opposition to the Court’s holding on expenditure limitations in his 
partial dissent in Buckley.  Unlike other justices, White did not view 
spending limits as a direct assault on “speech,” but instead as similar to 
time, place, and manner regulations, which should be upheld “so long as 
the purposes they serve are legitimate and sufficiently substantial.”318
In FEC v. National Conservative Political Action Committee, White 
asserted that while expenditures “produce” speech, the expenditures are 
not, themselves, speech.319  He went on to say: 
The burden on actual speech imposed by limitations on the spending 
of money is minimal and indirect.  All rights of direct political 
expression and advocacy are retained.  Even under the campaign 
laws as originally enacted, everyone was free to spend as much as 
they chose to amplify their views on general political issues, just not 
specific candidates.320
White’s opinion was that the members of the legislature were 
precisely those in the situation to know whether large-scale 
expenditures posed a threat to the integrity of the democratic process.321
He opined: 
[E]xpenditure limitations . . . maintain public confidence in the 
integrity of federal elections, equalize the resources available to the 
candidates, and hold the overall amount of money devoted to 
Nat’l Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. at 512.). 
318 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 264 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
319 See Nat’l Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. at 507-08, 511. 
320 Id. at 508-09. 
321 See FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 210 (1982). 
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political campaigning down to a reasonable level.  I consider these 
purposes both legitimate and substantial, and more than sufficient to 
support the . . . incidental and minor burden on actual speech.322
2.     Justice Stevens 
Justice Stevens has been profoundly influenced by Justice White’s 
approach to spending limits.323  Stevens firmly holds the view that there 
are several legitimate reasons to place reasonable restrictions on 
campaign expenditures.324  Among the interests Stevens cites is 
protection of the voters from misleading messages that might distort 
their subsequent decisions.  Stevens points out that “flooding the 
airwaves with slogans and sound-bites may well do more to obscure the 
issues than to enlighten listeners.”325  According to Stevens, protecting 
the electorate from potentially limitless one-sided propaganda not only 
prevents confusion and limits the amount of misinformation, but it also 
serves a leveling function, “protect[ing] equal access to the political 
arena.”326  Ultimately, Justice Stevens is convinced that the deference 
due Congress, particularly in an area in which its members arguably 
have special experience, dictates respect for legislatively created 
regulation.  This is particularly so, according to Stevens, because the 
proposed restriction “at best, has an indirect relationship to activity that 
affects the quantity—rather than the quality or the content—of 
repetitive speech in the marketplace of ideas.”327
322 Nat’l Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. at 509 (White J., dissenting). 
323 “Although I did not participate in the Court’s decision in Buckley, I have since been 
persuaded that Justice White—who maintained his steadfast opposition to Buckley’s view of 
expenditure limits—was correct.”  Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2778 (2008) (Stevens, J., 
concurring and dissenting) (citing Nat’l Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. at 507-12 (White, J., 
dissenting)). 
324 Several goals of campaign spending limits are advanced by Stevens (and others).  Among 
them are: improving the quality of speech by limiting its quantity, Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2779 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he imposition of reasonable limitations would likely have the 
salutary effect of improving the quality of the exposition of ideas.”); unburdening elected officials 
so that they are free to perform their responsibilities, Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. 
FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 649 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting); and increasing public confidence in the 
political system.  Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 283 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[R]obust 
debate of issues, candidate interaction with the electorate, and public involvement and confidence 
in the electoral process have decreased as campaign expenditures have increased . . . .” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  These advantages of spending limits will not be discussed at length 
here, although the merits of these benefits should not be underestimated. 
325 Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2778 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting). 
326 See Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 518 U.S. at 649-50 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
327 Randall, 548 U.S. at 279-80 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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3.     Justice Breyer 
In Shrink Missouri, Justice Breyer, in a concurring opinion, 
introduced his participatory self-government principle.  He took issue 
with the notion that an equality rationale is foreign to the First 
Amendment, noting: 
The Constitution often permits restrictions on the speech of some in 
order to prevent a few from drowning out the many—in Congress, 
for example, where constitutionally protected debate, Art. I, § 6, is 
limited to provide every Member an equal opportunity to express his 
or her views.  Or in elections, where the Constitution tolerates 
numerous restrictions on ballot access, limiting the political rights of 
some so as to make effective the political rights of the entire 
electorate.328
Breyer has captured two important points in this concurrence.  The 
first is that many political and government processes are designed 
specifically to regulate communication for the express purpose of 
preserving a voice for all.  Second, and relatedly, failing to regulate 
communication (in the name of free speech) has the perverse effect of 
suppressing speech—hence the need to structure procedures in this way.  
Although he advanced his general participatory self-government 
objective in the context of limits on contributions, the arguments he 
used to support such contribution limits directly support expenditure 
limits.329  In Breyer’s approach, we see the central notion of limiting 
funding for the purpose of promoting equality of voice: 
[R]estrictions upon the amount any one individual can contribute to a 
particular candidate seek to protect the integrity of the electoral 
process—the means through which a free society democratically 
translates political speech into concrete governmental action.  
Moreover, by limiting the size of the largest contributions, such 
restrictions aim to democratize the influence that money itself may 
bring to bear upon the electoral process.  In doing so, they seek to 
build public confidence in that process and broaden the base of a 
candidate’s meaningful financial support, encouraging the public 
participation and open discussion that the First Amendment itself 
presupposes.330
Breyer, like Stevens, noted Congress’s experience with the subject 
matter, commenting that “the legislature understands the problem—the 
threat to electoral integrity, the need for democratization—better than 
328 Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 402 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
329 Stephen Breyer, Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 245, 252 (2002); see 
also STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 39-
55 (2005). 
330 Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 401 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring) 
(citations omitted). 
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do we.  We should defer to its political judgment that unlimited 
spending threatens the integrity of the electoral process.”331  It is 
notable that Breyer uses the term “spending,” in light of the Court’s 
repeated denunciation of spending limits332 and its explicit rejection of 
such limits in Buckley.  Breyer’s use of this term, in conjunction with 
his participatory self-government goal, might seem to belie his opinion 
in Randall, where he authored the plurality opinion striking down 
Vermont’s spending limits.333
4.     Evidence from the “Majority” Itself 
The Court demonstrated little concern over the potential influence 
of private monies in connection with elections, provided that no actual 
or apparent corruption was present.  Yet the Court in McConnell upheld 
Title I under the reasoning that it “does little more than regulate the 
ability of wealthy individuals, corporations, and unions to contribute 
large sums of money to influence federal elections, federal candidates, 
and federal officeholders.”334  The notion that regulating the ability of 
wealthy donors to influence elections is of no concern would seem to be 
at odds with the Court’s repeated insistence that regulating “speech” in 
this manner is unconstitutional.  It also seems to clash with the Court’s 
insistence that it is not within Congress’s “power to determine that 
spending to promote one’s political views is wasteful, excessive, or 
unwise,”335 and its acceptance of solicitation limitations, which 
“increase the dissemination of information by forcing parties, 
candidates, and officeholders to solicit from a wider array of potential 
donors.”336  This language would seem to legitimize an equalizing 
rationale for regulation, controverting several of the Court’s holdings. 
331 Id. at 403. 
332 As mentioned, Austin—which upheld some spending limits for corporations—was the 
notable exception.  See Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990). 
333 See Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006). 
334 McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S 93, 138 (2003). 
335 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 57 (1976); see also supra note 252 and accompanying text. 
336 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 140 (finding that solicitation limitations have “only a marginal 
impact on political speech”). 
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IV. DEFINING THE PROBLEM WITH THE COURT’S CAMPAIGN FINANCE 
JURISPRUDENCE
A.     A New Definition of “Corruption” 
When the United States Court of Appeals of the D.C. Circuit 
handed down its opinion in Buckley, the court struck down limits on 
personal-funds spending.  The circuit court wrote: “Manifestly, the core 
problem of avoiding undisclosed and undue influence on candidates 
from outside interests has lesser application when the monies involved 
come from the candidate himself or from his immediate family.”337  The 
Supreme Court agreed, quoting the lower court approvingly and 
insisting that the “primary governmental interest served by the Act, the 
prevention of actual and apparent corruption of the political process, 
does not support the limitation on the candidate’s expenditure of his 
own personal funds.”338  From a pure quid pro quo standpoint, this must 
be correct.  The use of personal funds reduces a candidate’s dependence 
on outside contributions and lessens coercive pressures and resulting 
abuses campaign finance laws are designed to address.  However, the 
question remains whether quid pro quo corruption is the only legitimate 
consideration for campaign regulation purposes.339
The Court’s emphasis on quid pro quo corruption fails to account 
for the potential for other corruptive influences stemming from 
unlimited campaign spending.340  Specifically, the relationship between 
money and potentially manipulative communication strategies arguably 
337 Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 855 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
338 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 53. 
339 It has been remarked that “the Justices [cannot] agree on what purportedly is the central 
issue in campaign finance law: whether the challenged regulations were necessary to combat 
political corruption or the appearance of such corruption.”  Ringhand, supra note 21, at 77; see 
also Robert E. Mutch, On the Origins of Campaign Finance Regulation, 7 ELECTION L.J. 145, 
145 (2008) (reviewing KURT HOHENSTEIN, COINING CORRUPTION: THE MAKING OF THE 
AMERICAN FINANCE SYSTEM (2007)) (“That the concept of corruption covers more than bribery 
is almost beyond dispute.  What is hotly disputed, particularly when the subject is campaign 
finance, is how much more it covers.”). 
  It is also worth noting that the “appearance of corruption” interest advanced by the Court 
permits a broader definition of corruptive influences and extends the concept to one that takes 
into account public perception of the funding activities.  For more on public perception and 
“appearance of corruption,” see Nathaniel Persily & Kelli Lammie, Perceptions of Corruption 
and Campaign Finance: When Public Opinion Determines Constitutional Law, 153 U. PA. L.
REV. 119 (2004). 
340 See Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990) (finding that 
corporate independent expenditures could have “corrosive and distorting effects” and could 
“unfairly influence elections”). 
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supports a more expansive definition of “corruption.”341  This notion is 
not entirely foreign, even to the majority.  For example, the Court 
deviated from its usual narrow conception of corruptive influence in 
Shrink Missouri, where the Court identified a “broader threat from 
politicians too compliant with the wishes of large contributors.”342
Admittedly, the Shrink Missouri opinion still relies upon a concept of 
corruption that is grounded in a money-for-political-favors based 
rationale. 
As detailed earlier in this Article, the Court has permitted 
regulation of campaign monies only where it has seen a compelling 
governmental interest sufficient to outweigh any freedom-of-speech 
concerns.343  It is from this basic rationale that the Court derives 
authority for the regulation of quid pro quo contributions.  The question 
left unanswered is whether another type of corruption may pose 
similarly important concerns.  Perhaps the definition of corruption 
ought to be expanded to include the potential for distortion in voting 
behavior as a result of heavy-handed psychological tactics.344
The task of supporting a truly democratic voting process while 
simultaneously guarding other principles fundamental to a free society 
is the challenge that has faced the Court throughout its campaign-
finance jurisprudence history.  One commentator has called this the 
judiciary’s “democracy-defining dilemma”;345 the term “democracy” is 
frequently used and rarely defined,346 but when a definition is advanced, 
it usually includes the notion of “fair” elections.347  Many philosophers, 
341 See Ronald Dworkin, Free Speech and the Dimensions of Democracy, in IF BUCKLEY FELL:
A FIRST AMENDMENT BLUEPRINT FOR REGULATING MONEY IN POLITICS 63, 70-72 (E. Joshua 
Rosenkranz ed., 1999) (asserting that impediments to full citizen participation are critically 
important in a democracy).  For sources supporting a more expansive definition of “corruption,” 
see infra notes 350-364.  For theoretical and empirical support for campaign spending limits, see 
supra Part II. 
342 FEC v. Shrink Missouri Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 389 (2000). 
343 See supra Part III. 
344 A common understanding of what constitutes “democracy” has been difficult to form 
because of “the enormous difficulty in determining the definitional questions of ‘what’ is a 
democracy and ‘when’ is there a democracy.”  Matthew Griffin, Note, Accrediting Democracies: 
Does the Credentials Committee of the United Nations Promote Democracy Through Its 
Accreditation Process, and Should It?, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 725, 771 (2000) (arguing 
that it is inappropriate for the United Nations to have an accreditation process that relies upon 
passing a democracy test because, among other reasons, the notion that one can define democracy 
is misguided). 
345 Ringhand, supra note 21, at 77. 
346 For instance, “[m]ost of the work on governance appears satisfied with a description or 
provision of a shopping list of ingredients for good governance.  Such elements include 
accountability, transparency, anti-corruption, rule of law, advancement for women, democracy 
and decentralization.”  Botchway, supra note 21, at 161. 
347 See Bruce E. Cain, Garrett’s Temptation, 85 VA. L. REV. 1589, 1601-02 (1999) (“Three 
conditions characterize a fair party system: (1) The rules are impartial in their discriminatory 
effects—the system is, on average, equally discriminatory or advantageous to any particular party 
that gets a certain level of electoral support; (2) the system allows for the free contestation of 
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political scientists, and legal scholars have written in the area of 
democratic theory; an extensive discussion of this literature is beyond 
the scope of this Article.  For present purposes, it will suffice to assume 
that liberal democracy depends upon a free and willing voting public, 
and a voting process that is unencumbered by systematic, wide-scale 
manipulation by any segment of the public, individual candidate, or 
political party.348  Political advertising and other forms of propaganda 
are entrenched and vital aspects of the American political process, and 
political candidates inevitably tout their experience, promote their 
policies, and attack their opponents.  However, while vigorous debate 
and self-promotion are vital elements of the American political process, 
temperance and egalitarianism are crucial as well.349  In order for a 
government to operationalize democratic principles, it must place 
reasonable constraints upon a variety of institutions—and must accept 
restraints itself—that might otherwise undermine objectives of self-
governance. 
B.     Corruptive Inequality of Funding 
Inequality in the tactical psychological-political competition is 
another danger of unlimited spending related to voter manipulation.  
The amount of money required to craft subtle and conspicuous political 
strategy, the funds required to hire pricey consultants, conduct research, 
and carry targeted messages to identified segment of the population puts 
the political race beyond the reach of all but a few politically inclined 
individuals.  The cost of modern political campaigns has led some to 
offices at some level; and (3) the system satisfies the condition of popular sovereignty such that 
alternatives with more numerous support are generally preferred over others.”); see also Richard 
C. Reuben, Democracy and Dispute Resolution: The Problem of Arbitration, 67 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 279, 303 (2004) (“Just as the political, legal, and social capital values of democracy 
largely serve to support individual autonomy with respect to self-government through an 
informed elective process, so too these values inform autonomy with regard to dispute-resolution 
choices in a democracy, thus justifying a heavier emphasis on autonomy over other values.”). 
348 See Dworkin, supra note 341, at 70-72. 
349 See, e.g., Kenneth Lasson, Torture, Truth-Serum, and Ticking Bombs: Toward a Pragmatic 
Perspective on Coercive Interrogation, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 329 (2008) (“[W]ithout restraint, 
what is to prevent a once-fair-minded regime from evolving into one like those of Hitler, Stalin, 
or Pol Pot, which epitomize an ends-justifies-the-means view of government that leads to the 
murders of millions?” (emphasis added)); see also Bradshaw v. Rodgers, 20 Johns. 103, 106 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1822) (holding that the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause “relate[s] to the powers 
of the national government, and was intended as a restraint on that government”), rev’d, 20 Johns. 
735 (N.Y. 1823); Tamara R. Piety, Against Freedom of Commercial Expression, 29 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2583, 2658 (2008) (arguing that it is in the interest of the public for courts and legislatures 
to constrain commercial expression just as it is in the best interest of the public to enjoy 
protection of the First Amendment and the resulting restraint on government). 
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worry that the goals of democracy are frustrated when the field of 
potential contenders is so circumscribed.350
Not only are voters left with a limited pool of political candidates, 
but the candidates who do run often have very different levels of 
political viability as a simple function of their relative resources.  Of 
particular concern is the ability of citizens to promote, in any 
meaningful way, their chosen candidate.  A single well-funded private 
or corporate actor can provide a greater advantage to a candidate than 
multiple (sometimes many multiple) individuals who lack substantial 
financial resources.  One commentator expressed the view that 
[a]llowing corporations to make campaign contributions may 
increase the quantity of political speech available to voters, but could 
decrease the ability of individuals to influence election 
outcomes. . . .  [I]s democracy better served by . . . a system of 
unregulated political spending, or by one that attempts to equalize 
the influence of a variety of speakers?351
Spending limits would ameliorate this problem by leveling the 
playing field upon which campaigns are fought without either side 
having an unfair advantage based on financial resources alone.352
Germane to the discussion of spending limits and effects on 
election outcomes is Ronald Dworkin’s notion of “partnership 
democracy.”353  This form of democracy is based on the idea that 
citizens should assume an active role in political decision-making.354
The participatory element of partnership democracy, which involves 
shaping opinion, requires that the public be more than passive recipients 
of political communication.  Instead, it conceives of a populace that is 
empowered to actively contribute to the political conversation.  
Dworkin asserts that “[p]eople cannot plausibly regard themselves as 
partners in an enterprise of self-government when they are effectively 
shut out from the political debate because they cannot afford a 
grotesquely high admission price.”355  The admission price remains 
high specifically because without reasonable limits on the amount well-
endowed entities can spend, such expenditures literally dwarf the 
350 Botchway has commented: 
What is important is that people have a meaningful participation in the election of their 
representatives.  In that case, they may be able to elect representatives who reflect their 
ideals and concerns.  This requires the removal of tangible and latent obstacles to the 
emergence of candidates.  Requirements based on wealth, ethnicity, education, sex, 
religion and publicity can frustrate the emergence of competent candidates and thereby 
limit the options available to the electorate. 
Botchway, supra note 21, at 190. 
351 See Ringhand, supra note 21, at 78 (emphasis added). 
352 See Ewing, supra note 21. 
353 Dworkin, supra note 341, at 70-72; see also Ronald Dworkin, The Curse of American 
Politics, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Oct. 17, 1996, at 19-24. 
354 See supra note 353. 
355 See Dworkin, supra note 341, at 78-79. 
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contributions of the “average” citizen.356  The prohibition on spending 
limits established in Buckley and upheld in subsequent Court decisions 
perpetuates this inequality of voice.357
The harm is not limited to those small donors whose dollars will 
never gain them admission to the political debate; it also extends to the 
public at large, which is repeatedly exposed to powerful messages on 
behalf of a candidate favored by those with financial wherewithal.358
The danger is greatest in societies in which disparities in wealth create 
diversity of opportunity for such influence.359  As Jamin Raskin and 
John Bonifaz have noted, “[i]n market societies where wealth is 
unevenly distributed yet crucial to the processes of election and 
governance, the inegalitarian logic of the economy undermines the 
egalitarian logic of one person, one vote democracy.”360  Importantly, as 
Rawls argues: 
The liberties protected by the principle of participation lose much of 
their value whenever those who have greater private means are 
permitted to use their advantages to control the course of public 
debate.  For eventually these inequalities will enable those better 
situated to exercise a larger influence over the development of 
legislation.361
The way to assure that certain segments of the populace do not 
gain an inordinately loud voice in the political process is to exercise 
some measure of control over spending.  Edwin Baker describes 
institutional “‘sluices’ through which public opinion flows” that are 
specifically structured in such a way as to promote various goals, 
including fairness and openness.362  Baker argues in favor of regulating 
election-oriented communication in order to combat the “major 
dangers” facing the democratic election process.363  Commentators who 
356 See Neuborne, supra note 30, at 120-21. 
357 Id.
358 See Baker, supra note 175, at 43 (arguing for the importance of measures to assure that 
influences on public opinion are “appropriate”). 
359 See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV.
L. REV. 2311, 2313 (2006) (“To this day, the idea of self-sustaining political competition built 
into the structure of government is frequently portrayed as the unique genius of the U.S. 
Constitution, the very basis for the success of American democracy.”). 
360 Raskin & Bonifaz, Democratically Financed Elections, supra note 175, at 1162.  Raskin 
and Bonifaz describe the problem thus: 
More deeply, the tyranny of private money corrupts the democratic relationship of one 
person/one vote by making it exceedingly difficult for poor or middle-class persons to 
run for office, by leaving them without meaningful electoral choices, and by assuring 
that wealthy interests will set the parameters of political debate and the nature of the 
legislative agenda.  Not surprisingly, the nonaffluent majority continues to lose ground 
in public policy and turn away in disgust from the political system. 
Raskin & Bonifaz, Wealth Primary, supra note 175, at 277 (1993). 
361 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 225 (1971). 
362 See Baker, supra note 175, at 44. 
363 Id.
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favor greater regulation have argued strenuously that more must be 
done to promote equality and fairness in the election process.364
CONCLUSION
A robust body of empirical evidence demonstrates that citizens are 
not “rational” when they vote, and further, that their reliance upon 
heuristical processing and their vulnerability to various biases 
influences their voting behavior.  Importantly for campaign regulation 
purposes, these irrational patterns of processing information are 
exploited by political candidates.  Research on voting behavior has 
illustrated the powerful effects of strategic campaign spending, and has 
demonstrated a link between money spent and voting outcomes.  The 
implications of research and theory are troubling; simply put, voters 
often make incorrect choices (choices that are inconsistent with their 
own professed attitudes and goals) when they rely on cues supplied by 
sources that are politically motivated.  The potential for campaign 
spending to influence vote choice is particularly troubling in light of the 
Court’s refusal to recognize any governmental interest justifying 
campaign spending limits.  This Article has identified two important 
harms associated with unlimited campaign spending.  Unregulated 
spending (1) facilitates the ability of well-funded actors to exploit 
cognitive biases and (2) creates gross inequities in the relative ability of 
actors to influence election outcomes.
Although the Supreme Court has rejected an equalizing rationale 
for limiting campaign spending, the leveling approach has been 
embraced by other societies who hold democratic elections.  Great 
Britain, for example, has regulated campaign spending for more than a 
hundred years.365  The purpose of the legislation, according to the 
British courts, is “to achieve a level financial playing field between 
competing candidates, so as to prevent perversion of the voters’ 
democratic choice between competing candidates within constituencies 
by significant disparities of local expenditure.”366  The result of 
364 Wright, supra note 25, at 625-26.  Wright argues that:  
Political equality is the cornerstone of American democracy.  Today’s electoral 
processes, tainted by huge inequalities in funds and special access for special interests, 
fall far short of that ideal and are moving further away every year.  But rather than give 
up faith and drift with the tide, we must reexamine and renew our commitment to 
realizing America’s fundamental political ideals. 
Id. 
365 The initial British act regulating elections, the Representation of the People Act of 1884, 
has been amended many times—most notably in 1918, 1948, 1949, and 1983—and was most 
recently amended by the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act of 2000. 
366 R v. Jones, [1999] 2 Crim. App. 253, 255.  U.K. law currently provides that “[t]he election 
expenses incurred by or on behalf of a candidate at an election must not in the aggregate exceed 
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excessive or dramatically asymmetrical spending by political candidates 
has been the subject of concern on the part of commentators in the 
United States as well.367  It has been remarked that “[n]one of the 
rationales for strong protection of free expression—truth, autonomy and 
self-fulfillment, social stability, or self-government—justifies the 
continuing and unchecked abuses that excessive spending has brought 
to the electoral process.”368
Legislatures intuit what social science confirms.  Congress and a 
number of state legislatures have enacted measures designed to limit 
campaign spending.369  As recently as 2006, the Court struck down state 
legislation capping spending in Randall v. Sorrell.370  The Vermont 
legislature’s concern that unlimited spending had distorted the election 
process and compromised the fairness of election outcomes is telling.371
In a variety of contexts, legislators have described the corrosive, 
unequal, and distorting effects of money in politics.  Some of the best 
evidence that spending undermines the democratic nature of elections in 
the United States comes from congressional insiders.372
The Court’s focus on protecting speech is misplaced in the 
campaign finance context, where the freedom to communicate ideas is 
best preserved by protecting some voices from being “drown[ed] out” 
and by limiting the ability of moneyed interests to determine election 
outcomes.373  Until the Court recognizes the dangers inherent in 
[the permitted maximum].”  Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act, 2000, c. 41, § 132 
(amending Representation of the People Act, 1983, c. 2, § 76). 
367 Ewing, supra note 21; see also Botchway, supra note 21; Ringhand, supra note 21, at 78. 
368 Wright, supra note 25, at 636. 
369 As previously discussed, FECA was the federal congressional legislation.  Federal Election 
Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified as amended in sections of 
2, 18, and 47 U.S.C.).  According to the Hoover Institution: 
With voters approving ballot initiatives in Massachusetts and Arizona in the 1998 
elections, these two states will join the 22 that already have statutes on the books 
providing some sort of public financing for election campaigns.  Some 12 states and 
New York City now have some form of expenditure limitations. 
Hoover Institution, Campaign Finance: State and Local Overview, 
http://www.campaignfinancesite.org/structure/states1.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2009). 
370 Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006). 
371 Id.
372 Richard Hall, Equalizing Expenditures in Congressional Campaigns: A Proposal, 6 
ELECTION L.J. 145, 147 (2007) (“[The claim that] money enhances access to influential 
legislators comes from a variety of sources, including reports of congressional insiders.”). 
  Moreover, elected officials have voiced concerns not only about the potential for 
inequality, but also about their inability to effectively represent their constituents because of the 
non-stop need to fundraise.  See Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and the Widening Gyre of Fund-
Raising: Why Campaign Spending Limits May Not Violate the First Amendment After All, 94 
COLUM. L. REV. 1281, 1282 (1994) (“‘Disproportionate influence’ is hard to measure, and absent 
particularly nefarious patterns perhaps is defensible as an inevitable phenomenon in any real 
world of power. . . .  [However,] [t]he quality no less than the equity of representation is a 
concern of constitutional dimension.”). 
373 Wright, supra note 25, at 631. 
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unchecked campaign spending, wealthy actors, candidates, and political 
parties will continue to distort election outcomes by engaging in wide-
spread exploitation of the electorate.374  In order to increase the 
legitimacy of the elective process, the Supreme Court should permit 
legislative bodies to structure campaign finance laws in ways that 
encourage citizen involvement, increase candidate accountability, and 
restrain manipulative psychological tactics.375
374 David Cole, First Amendment Antitrust: The End of Laissez-Faire in Campaign Finance, 9 
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 236, 237 (1991).  Cole argues that:  
[C]apitalism and democracy are an uneasy mix.  Free market capitalism threatens the 
free marketplace of ideas by giving certain voices inordinate influence, not because of 
the power of their ideas, but because of the volume they can generate for their voices 
with dollars earned through commercial activities.  Because even ‘free speech’ costs 
money, those who succeed in the economic marketplace are able to purchase far more 
speech opportunities than those who do not. 
Id. 
375 Spencer Overton has suggested that “[r]eforms such as establishing matching funds and 
providing tax credits for smaller contributions, combined with emerging technology, would 
enable more Americans to make contributions and would enhance their voices in our democracy.”  
Spencer Overton, The Donor Class: Campaign Finance, Democracy, and Participation, 153 U.
PA. L. REV. 73, 73 (2004).
